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INTRODUCTION
In 1994, as part of the Violence Against Women Act, Congress en-
acted a provision entitled the "civil rights remedy."' This remedy gave
victims of "gender-motivated violence" a right to sue in federal court.'
Proponents of the remedy wanted to place violence against women in
the context of federal civil rights law.' Historically, states treated vio-
lence against women, especially violence that occurred within the home
or by someone the woman knew, as a "Private matter" and not an ap-
propriate realm for legal intervention. By enacting the civil rights
remedy, feminists attempted to re-categorize violence against women.
Designers of the remedy characterized acts of rape and domestic vio-
lence as "civil rights" violations rather than "private" violence to show
that gender-motivated violence affects women as a class, not just indi-
vidually. By placing the matter in federal court, rather than in state
courts where the violence often had been ignored or trivialized, support-
ers of the remedy sent a message that violence against women is a matter
of public and national concern, and a federal civil rights issue.
It is possible to frame and understand the civil rights provision in a
number of ways. The provision could be described as a discrimination
and civil rights law, or a tort law, a rape law, a domestic violence law, or
a law that regulates crime. Writers could have framed the provision as a
large structural reform: emphasizing that it placed power in the hands of
victims of violence rather than prosecutors. Or they could have focused
on the economic aspects of the remedy, which offered victims an oppor-
tunity for financial relief.
Proponents of the remedy hoped to change attitudes about violence
against women by categorizing gender-based violence as a civil rights
issue. To change public attitudes, the meaning and scope of the civil
rights remedy had to be communicated. Newspapers play a key role in
forming public attitudes and understandings of the law; they describe,
explain, and categorize laws and court decisions that most people will
1. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
tit. IV, subtit. C, § 40302, 108 Star. 1796, 1941 (1994) ("This subtitle may be cited
as the 'Civil Rights Remedies for Gender-Motivated Violence Act'"); see also 42
U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) (labeling heading of statutory provision "Civil Rights" and
stating that provision established a "federal civil rights cause of action.").
2. A "crime of violence motivated by gender" was defined as a "crime of violence com-
mitted because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an
animus based on the victim's gender." 42 U.S.C. . 13981(d)(1).
3. See discussion infra Part II.A. 1.
4. See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love'" Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).
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never read themselves. Debates about laws play out in papers through
editorials and commentary pieces.
This Article analyzes how newspapers described and characterized
the civil rights provision over the past decade and shaped the public dis-
course about the law. I examine how lower federal courts, and
eventually the Supreme Court, categorized the VAWA remedy when
deciding whether Congress had acted within its commerce powers. After
considering why there may have been resistance in the press and in the
courts to VAWA's categorization of violence against women as a civil
rights issue, I conclude by examining the remedies that have been intro-
duced at the state and local level for victims of gender-motivated
violence, and discuss the public debate that has surrounded these reme-
dies thus far.
I begin my analysis by examining media coverage of the provision
when it was first introduced in Congress and continue until after the
Supreme Court's May 2000 decision in United States v. Morrison to
strike the civil rights remedy down.5 I demonstrate that reporters'
"objective" characterizations of the VAWA provision changed over time
and argue that this affected public understanding of the remedy.6
5. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). A five-person majority of the Supreme Court held in Morrison
that Congress had exceeded its Commerce Clause power in enacting the civil rights
remedy, and also lacked the power to enact the provision under section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The petitioner in the case was Christy Brzonkala, a student at
Virginia Polytechnic Institute. Brzonkala alleged that two athletes took turns raping
her and one later claimed "I like to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of them."
Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 935 F. Supp. 779, 784 (W.D. Va. 1996). Ini-
tially, the university imposed an immediate wo-semester suspension on one of the
assailants but later reduced it to a deferred suspension (after graduation) and a re-
quired one-hour educational program. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 132 F.3d
949, 955 (4th Cir. 1997) (Motz J.). Brzonkala sued her alleged rapists, Antonio Mor-
rison and James Crawford, as well as the school. The district court found that
Brzonkala had stated a claim of gender-motivated violence, but held that the VAWA
provision exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause power. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp.
at 784. A panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, upholding the con-
stitutionality of the provision, Brzonkala, 132 F.3d 949, but the full Fourth Circuit
reversed, holding the provision unconstitutional, Brzonkala, 169 F.3d 820, 826 (4th
Cit. 1999) (en banc). The name of the case before the Supreme Court, United States
v. Morrison, differs from the cases below because the United States intervened arguing
that the provision should be upheld.
6. For the period between 1990 and 1995, when the Act was before Congress, I review
articles in Lexis's "major newspapers" database. To be in Lexis's "major newspapers"
database, a United States newspaper must be listed in the top 50 circulation in Editor
& Publisher Year Book. Newspapers published outside the United States must be in
the English language and listed as a national newspaper in Benn's World Media Direc-
tory or be one of the top 5% in circulation for the country.
2003]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER &LAW
Several trends emerge from an examination of "objective" press
coverage of the VAWA remedy. First, very few articles-either before
the remedy was enacted or during the litigation regarding its constitu-
tionality-explained in any depth the concept of "gender-motivated"
violence or examined the scope of the remedy. These articles declared
that the provision allowed rape victims to sue, but most did not explore
the idea that some types of violence against women constitute gender-
based discrimination. Second, there was a substantial difference in the
way articles described the remedy before and shortly after it was enacted
from the way they described it after the Supreme Court struck it down.
Virtually all the articles called the remedy a "civil rights law" when it
was before Congress. Very few articles, however, reported that the Su-
preme Court had struck down a civil rights law. What articles once
referred to as a "civil rights remedy" they later called a "civil remedy."
Next, I examine arguments made in commentary pieces and
newspaper editorials to demonstrate how proponents and opponents
of the remedy also shaped the debate.' I divide this debate into three
time periods.8
For the period after the enactment of the provision, but before the Court struck
it down, I focus on six widely-circulated newspapers, as well as a Virginia paper that
followed the development of the Morrison case from its beginning. I look at articles in
USA Today, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Wall Street Journal, and
the Washington Post which are the top five most widely-circulated papers in the
United States. I do not discuss articles in the Daily News (New York), the sixth most
widely-circulated paper because this paper carried little coverage of the VAWA provi-
sion. I look instead at articles in the Chicago Tribune, the seventh most widely-
circulated paper. I also review articles in the Richmond Times Dispatch, a widely circu-
lated Virginia paper that carried articles about the Morrison case as it progressed.
Statistics about circulation were taken from the Audit Bureau of Circulations report.
Audit Bureau of Circulations, Reader Profile: Top 100 Newspapers by Daily Circula-
tion, http://www.accessabc.com/reader/topl00.htm (Aug. 28, 2002).
For the days right after the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison, I look at arti-
cles in the "major newspapers" database to get a broad sample of how papers
described the decision.
7. Contributors included regular newspaper columnists, members of Congress, and
lawyers in the Morrison case. Newspapers editors also contributed to the debate by
publishing editorials for or against the provision.
8. First, I look at commentary and editorials published from 1990 to 1995 when the
remedy was before Congress. Next, I look at the debate in newspapers leading up to,
but not including the Court's decision. The final part of this section considers com-
mentary and editorials written after the Court handed down its decision. I draw
commentary and editorials from newspapers in the "News Group File, All" Lexis da-
tabase, which includes over a thousand publications.
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Newspapers were split in their support of VAWA before it was en-
acted.9 Before the enactment, members of Congress and individuals
from the National Organization for Women (NOW) wrote commen-
tary pieces to gather support for the civil rights provision. Those writing
against the provision, at this time, were mostly professional columnists.
During this period both commentators supporting the remedy and
those opposed to it made claims about discrimination and equal rights.
Proponents of the remedy, including individuals from NOW, members
of Congress, and others, emphasized that the remedy was needed to pro-
tect the rights of victims of gender-based violence. Opponents viewed
the remedy as undermining the rights of men, the rights of defendants,
or the rights of minorities. Neither side raised constitutional arguments
at this time, but they did disagree about the appropriateness of the fed-
eral role from a policy perspective.
After the Morrison litigation began, but before the Supreme Court
ruled on the case, some of the same arguments about the provision were
repeated and some new arguments emerged. Individuals from NOW
and other women's organizations wrote commentary in support of the
constitutionality of the provision. Opposition came from the same col-
umnists who had opposed the law from the start. Joining these
columnists were lawyers for the defendants in the Morrison case, mem-
bers of conservative organizations, and other columnists. Debate
centered around several axes: 1) whether the provision promoted the
rights of women or undermined the rights of men and minorities;
2) whether the remedy was a civil rights law or a family law or a tort law
or a law regulating crime; 3) whether the federal role was necessary and
justified or unconstitutionally infringed on the states' rights; and 4)
whether the connection between gender-motivated violence and com-
merce was sufficiently strong to satisfy Commerce Clause
requirements.'1
After the Court's decision, many law professors wrote commentary
on the Court's ruling, as did many of the same people who had ex-
pressed opinions previously. A large number of newspapers also wrote
editorials after the Court's decision. Newspaper editors made their own
determinations about whether Congress had "overstepped" its bounds
9. Eight papers expressed support for the bill as a whole or for the civil rights remedy in
particular. Six papers opposed the enactment of the civil rights remedy.
10. Some newspapers wrote editorials during this time period, although most editorials
appeared after the Court's decision. During the period before the Court's decision,
one newspaper supported the constitutionality of the provision and seven wrote
against it.
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or acted appropriately in enacting the civil rights provision. These edito-
rials provide a sense of how effectively proponents and opponents of the
remedy made their case to the public. Most papers supported the
Court's decision, some expressed opposition to it, and one fell in be-
tween.1 1 Interestingly, several papers that had supported the enactment
of VAWA originally switched sides and wrote in support of the Court's
decision to strike down the civil rights provision.
Federal judges also contributed to the debate over the provision."
Almost all of the lower federal courts that considered the constitutional-
ity of the remedy concluded that Congress acted within its commerce
powers. These courts accepted Congress's findings that gender-
motivated violence deterred women from full participation in the econ-
omy. They chose to categorize gender-motivated violence as a civil
rights matter and a matter of federal concern. The Supreme Court,
however, held in Morrison that Congress had exceeded its authority un-
der the Commerce Clause. The Court, refusing to accept the category
shift that Congress and feminists attempted to make, categorized the
VAWA provision as a criminal law rather than a civil rights or discrimi-
nation law. The Court said this form of criminal activity was
"traditionally" a matter regulated by the states and held that federal
regulation of the activity was unconstitutional. Despite Congress's ex-
11. Out of the 43 papers that wrote editorials, twenty-eight wrote in support of the
Court's decision and fourteen papers expressed opposition to the decision.
12. I look at all federal cases that considered the constitutionality of the civil rights rem-
edy and examine how judges understood and categorized the remedy.
13. Judith Resnik uses the phrase "categorical federalism" to describe the reasoning that
the Court used in Morrison to decide which activities Congress has the power to regu-
late. Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111
YALE L.J. 619 (2001). This method of reasoning first "assumes that a particular rule
of law regulates a single aspect of human action: Laws are described as about 'the
family,' 'crime,' or 'civil rights' as if laws were univocal and human interactions simi-
larly one-dimensional." Id. at 620. Categorical federalism "relies on such
identification to locate authority in state or national governments and then uses the
identification as if to explain why power to regulate resides within one or another
governmental structure." Id. Finally, categorical federalism "has a presumption of ex-
clusive control-to wit, if it is family law, it belongs only to the states. Categories are
thus constructed around two sets of human activities, the subject matter of regulation
and the locus of governance, with each assumed to have intelligible boundaries and
autonomous spheres." Id. Professor Resnik says that "the quaint tidiness of categori-
cal federalism ought to prompt skepticism." Id. She argues that "many categories are
intertwined in lawmaking enterprises" and "more than one source of legal regulation
is likely to apply to any set of behaviors." Id. at 622. Professor Resnik offers evidence
that the federal government has historically regulated "family law" and other areas
that the Court claims have been the exclusive domain of the states. Professor Resnik's
insights into categorization provide the foundation for this Article's examination of
categorization of the VAWA remedy by newspapers and commentators.
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tensive findings that gender-motivated violence deters women from par-
ticipation in the economy, the Court held that violence against women
is not "economic in nature" and that its link. to commerce was too at-
tenuated for Congress to reach under its commerce powers.
The attempt to re-categorize violence against women as a civil
rights issue failed in the Supreme Court and was ultimately resisted by
much of the press. Despite efforts by commentators to emphasize the
civil rights issue at stake, most editorials sided with the Court, and most
newspapers chose not to frame the Court's decision as a rejection of a
civil rights statute. There was a lack of dialogue and discourse in the
press about the idea of violence against women as a form of class-based
discrimination. For some judges, reporters, commentators, and editors it
was more "natural" to think of the VAWA provision as a "rape law,"
"criminal law," or "domestic relations law" and to associate these areas
of law with the states. Because certain types of violence against women
had so long been considered private and individual, rather than public
and group-based, it was hard for some to accept the category shift. A
greater exploration by the press of the concept of violence against
women as gender discrimination would have challenged traditional
categorizations and strengthened efforts at re-categorization.
Understanding the last decade of discourse and debate over the
VAWA provision gives insight into current and future efforts to create
and revise civil rights statutes. A number of states and localities are now
considering enacting civil remedies for victims of gender-motivated vio-
lence. Drafters of these new statutes face choices about how to frame
these remedies and how to shape the debate surrounding them. Enact-
ment of statutes at the local level may help bring about the changes in
attitude and practice that the drafters of VAWA wanted. Local remedies
have the potential to be more far-reaching and effective than the federal
civil rights remedy. But proponents of local remedies may have to con-
front some of the same arguments that were made against the VAWA
remedy. Although federalism arguments cannot be raised against the
local remedies, there is continued public resistance to labeling violence
against women as discrimination or an issue of civil rights. Those who
wish to create and revise rights for victims of gender-motivated violence
must learn from the last decade of debate about VAWA's civil rights
remedy. Drafters of new remedies must take steps to ensure that the
press describes and categorizes the new laws accurately. Proponents of
new remedies must shape the debate about the laws and counter the
arguments against them-not only in the legislature and courts, but also
in the press.
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Part I of this Article examines objective press coverage of VAWA
when it was before Congress, and during the litigation of its
constitutionality, and draws two conclusions. First, very few articles
explored the concept of gender-motivated violence in any depth or
discussed what acts were covered by the Act. Second, while the press
originally described the VAWA provision as a civil rights remedy when
it was enacted by Congress, a shift occurred when articles reported on
the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison. Articles reporting on the
decision instead characterized the provision as a "civil remedy" or a
"rape law." Part II looks at the subjective debate in the press over the
VAWA remedy by analyzing commentary and editorials. Part III
examines the contributions of federal judges to the debate over the
provision and argues that, although the provision was struck down by
the Supreme Court, an overwhelming majority of lower federal court
judges found the provision to be constitutional and agreed with
Congress's characterization of the provision as a civil rights law. Part IV
argues that the categorical shift in the press and courts away from a civil
rights law and towards a civil remedy or a rape law could be attributed
to cognitive processes. Part V concludes that state and local ordinances,
by categorizing gender-motivated violence as a civil rights issue, present
a viable alternative to the federal civil rights remedy envisioned by
Congress.
I. PRESS COVERAGE
Two major conclusions can be drawn from my examination of the
articles written about VAWA's civil rights remedy. 4 First, very few arti-
cles explored what "gender-motivated" violence is or what acts would
fall within the scope of the remedy. Articles reported that the remedy
was for victims of "gender-motivated" violence but did not explain what
acts were covered. Second, articles described the remedy differently
when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Morrison than
14. 1 look at articles written about the civil rights remedy beginning when the provision
was introduced in Congress and continuing until the Supreme Court's decision to
strike down the law. For the period between 1990 and 1995, when the Act was be-
fore Congress, I review articles in Lexis's "major newspapers" database. See supra note
6. For the period after enactment of the provision but before the Court struck it
down, I focus on articles appearing in USA Today, the New York Times, the Los Ange-
les Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, and the Chicago Tribune. I also
review the Richmond Times Dispatch, a paper that had a number of articles on the
Morrison case as it progressed. Finally, I look at articles in the "major newspapers" da-
tabase that reported on the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison.
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they had before and shortly after it was enacted. Articles called the pro-
vision a "civil rights law" when it was enacted and a "civil remedy" or a
"rape law" when the Court struck it down.
An understanding of the legislative history of the VAWA provision
is essential to analyzing the press coverage of the remedy.'5 In the origi-
nal 1990 draft of the provision, a "crime of violence motivated by the
victim's gender" was defined as "any rape, sexual assault, or abusive sex-
ual contact motivated by gender-based animus."'" Before the bill was
reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, new language
was added that expanded the remedy to include all crimes of violence
motivated by gender, not simply sexual violence. The new definition
stated that "any rape, sexual assault, or abusive contact, motivated by
gender" was included under the Act.'7 Thus, this definition would cover
gender-based violent acts without a sexual element, such as a crime like
the incident in Canada in which a man shot a number of female engi-
neering students while screaming, "I hate feminists."' 8
Before the bill was introduced in 1991, Senator Joseph Biden (D-
DE), a chief sponsor of the remedy, made several changes to it that re-
sponded to questions raised about the scope of the bill by other senators
and the Bush Justice Department.'9 The new version of the bill defined
a "crime of violence motivated by gender" as "any crime of violence...
including rape, sexual assault, sexual abuse, abusive sexual conduct, or
any other crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis
15. Victoria Nourse examined the legislative history of the civil rights remedy. Victoria F.
Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women
Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1996); see also J. Rebekka S.
Bonner, Note, Reconceptualizing VA WA s "Animus "for Rape in States'Emerging Post-
VA WA Civil Rights Legislation, 111 YALE L.J. 1417 (2002) (examining legislative his-
tory and court interpretations of VAWA's "animus" term and offering
recommendations for how this term should be interpreted in new state remedies).
16. S. 2754, 101st Cong. § 301(d), 136 CONG. Rc., 14,569 (1990); see also Nourse,
supra note 15, at 7.
17. S. 2754, 101st Cong. § 301(b)-(d) (1990), S. REP. No. 101-545, at 23 (1990) (cre-
ating a cause of action covering "crime[s] of violence overwhelmingly motivated by
the victim's gender[,] . . .including any rape, sexual assault, or abusive contact, moti-
vated by gender"). Drafters later removed the requirement that the violence be
"overwhelmingly" motivated by gender. See Nourse, supra note 15.
18. Shelley Page, Police Still Seek Identity of Man Who Massacred 14, TORONTO STAR,
Dec. 7, 1989, at Al. Proponents of VAWA raised this incident in testimony before
Congress as an example of gender-motivated violence. See Jack Sirica, Federal Protec-
tion of Women at Issue, NEWSDAY, Feb. 16, 1992, at 17 (noting testimony in Congress
where "[s]ome recall the Canadian mass murderer who gunned down 14 female en-
gineering students in 1989 while shouting, 'I hate feminists' ").
19. SeeNourse, supra note 15, at 13.
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of gender. ' 2' The bill also included a "limitations" section that specifi-
cally excluded "random" acts not motivated by gender.2' Later that year,
the Judiciary Committee amended the bill to delete references to par-
ticular sexual crimes in the definition of "motivated by gender., 2 Thus,
the "presumption that sexual crimes were gender-motivated was deleted
from the bill. 23
Opposition to the VAWA remedy began to mount. The Confer-
ence of Chief Justices of State Supreme Courts voted to oppose the
remedy in January 1991, stating that the bill would be used "as a bar-
gaining tool within the context of divorce negotiations" and thus would
21cause problems in the processing of divorce cases. Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated in his 1991 year-end report that VAWA's "definition
of a new crime is so open-ended, and the new private right of action so
sweeping, that the legislation could involve the federal courts in a whole
host of domestic relations disputes. '25 In February 1992, Senator Biden
attempted to address these concerns when he testified at House hear-
ings. Biden emphasized that the provision did not "federalize" every
violent act against women-it did "not cover random beatings in the
home or elsewhere. The only remedy [the provision] provides is for vio-
lent crimes motivated by gender discrimination. ,26
In April of 1993, Senator Biden and Senator Orrin Hatch (R-
Utah), the then ranking minority member of the Judiciary Committee,
agreed to negotiate before the bill was brought to the floor of the Senate
for debate. The major change was the addition of the "animus
requirement." To be covered under the act, crimes of violence had to be
"committed because of gender or on the basis of gender" and "due, at
least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender."27 The
"animus" requirement was an intermediate position between a "malice"
20. S. 15, 102d Cong. § 301(d)(l) (1991) (as introduced).
21. Id.§ 301(e)(1).
22. S. REP. No. 102-197, at 28 (1991).
23. Nourse, supra note 15, at 25.
24. See Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing on S. 15 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 314-17 (1991) (stating the official position of
the Conference of Chief Justices); see also Nourse, supra note 15, at 16.
25. See 138 CONG. REc. 581, 583 (1992) (reprinting a report on the state of the federal
judiciary by Chief Justice Rehnquist); see also Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judi-
ciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL.
L. REV. 269, 272-73 (2000) (describing the judiciary's opposition to VAWA).
26. Violence Against Women: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Criminal Justice of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 11 (1992) (statement of Senator Jo-
seph Biden).
27. Violence Against Women Act, S. 11, 103d Cong. 301(d)(1) (1993), S. REp. No.
103-138, at 30 (1993); see also Nourse, supra note 15, at 29.
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or an "animosity" standard-which would require a showing that the
defendant hated all members of a gender or intended to use the violence
as a message of gender hatred-and a "disparate impact" standard,
which would require only a demonstration of statistical disparity in the
impact of the act of violence on one gender.2" VAWA's animus standard
instead required a showing of "specific intent" or "purpose" to injure
based on gender. 29 This version of the VAWA remedy, with the animus
requirement, is the one that passed and became the law.
Looking at the legislative history of the civil rights remedy, it is
clear that much of the debate in Congress focused on the scope of the
remedy. The press, however, covered few of the changes, compromises,
and clarifications that were made. A reporter writing before October
1990 would be accurate in reporting that the bill was for victims of sex-
based crimes.3° But after October 1990, non-sexual violence was also
included. After various limitations to the bill were added, it became less
clear whether the remedy actually would apply to all rapes or all sex-
related crimes.
For the most part, both before and after the enactment of the rem-
edy, the press did not discuss the scope of the remedy or explore the
meaning of "gender-motivated" violence. Few articles mentioned the
animus requirement or examined the ways it might be read to limit the
scope of the remedy. Similarly, during the litigation of Morrison, many
articles reported that the remedy was for rape victims or victims of sex-
ual assault without exploring whether all victims of sex-related violence
were actually covered.3 Articles also failed to explain that victims of
gender-related violence, without a sexual element, could have a cause of
action under the remedy.
28. Nourse, supra note 15, at 29-30.
29. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 64 (1993) (stating that the animus requirement "eluci-
dates the committee's intent that a victim alleging a violation under this section must
have been targeted on the basis of his or her gender. The defendant must have had a
specific intent or purpose, based on the victim's gender, to injure the victim.").
30. There are only a few articles from this early date. See Ruth Lopez, Landmark Bill
Would Attack Escalating Violent Crime, CHI. TRIB., July 1, 1990, at C2 ("The bill
would make a sex crime a civil rights violation, enabling the victim to sue for dam-
ages."); Erin Marcus, Justice Department Rape Statistics Called Unrealistically Low,
WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1990, at A9 (reporting that the bill would "extend civil rights
protection to victims of sex-related crimes so that they could seek compensatory and
punitive damages in federal courts").
31. For example, the Hartford Courant said the Court "struck down a federal law that
allowed victims of sex-related violence to sue their attackers in federal court." Michael
Remez, High Court Throws Out Law on Sex Crimes, HARTFORD COURANT, May 16,
2000, at Al.
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The second major conclusion I draw from my examination of arti-
cles about the civil rights remedy is that articles, in general, described
the remedy differently after the Supreme Court decided Morrison than
they had when the remedy was before Congress. In particular, virtually
all of the articles describing the remedy before and soon after it was en-
acted called it a "federal civil rights law" or reported that it provided
civil rights protections. The use of this language of "civil rights" is strik-
ing because years later, when describing the Supreme Court's decision in
Morrison, very few articles described the Court as striking down a civil
rights law. Instead, most articles from this period described the provi-
sion as allowing rape victims to sue in federal court and called the
remedy a "civil remedy" rather than a "civil rights remedy."32 Most arti-
cles quoted NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund (NOWLDEF)
lawyers as saying that the decision was a loss for civil rights and quoted
the defendants' attorneys stating that it was a victory for the Constitu-
tion.33 However, NOW's statement about civil rights in this context did
not appear objective. Readers of these articles would not know that
Congress itself had categorized the law as a "civil rights remedy." Unlike
reporters who wrote articles when the remedy was first enacted, report-
ers who wrote about the Morrison decision did not categorize the
remedy as a civil rights law. The label "civil rights" did not stick.
A. Pre-Litigation Press Coverage
In this section I examine press coverage of the VAWA remedy
provision before litigation in Morrison began.34 Newspapers almost
universally used the words "civil rights" to describe the remedy. USA
Today, the Chicago Tribune, the Buffalo News, the Independent
(London), and the Chicago Sun-Times all said that the bill would make
32. For example, an article in the New York Times noted, "[tihe majority concluded that
the civil remedy provision was neither a valid regulation of interstate commerce nor a
proper means of enforcing the equal protection guarantee of the 14th Amendment."
Linda Greenhouse, Women Lose Right to Sue Attackers in Federal Court, N.Y. TIMES,
May 16, 2001, at Al (emphasis added).
33. The New York Times, for example, quoted Kathryn J. Rogers of NOWLDEF who
said the decision took "the federal government out of the business of defining civil
rights and creating remedies." Id. The paper quoted Michael E. Rosman, general
counsel of the Center for Individual Rights, which challenged VAWA on behalf of
the defendants, remarking that "the decision was a welcome reminder that democ-
ratic majorities are limited by the text of the Constitution." Id.
34. I review articles in the "major newspapers" database that mention the civil rights
remedy from the time it was introduced until after it was enacted.
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sexual assault and gender-based violence a "civil rights violation.0' The
Star Tribune said that the law would make suits "civil rights cases," 6 and
the Washington Post, Orlando Sentinel Times, and Denver Post reported
that the law would give "civil rights protection. 37 The Houston
Chronicle said that VAWA would create a "civil rights remedy, 3 8 and
the Christian Science Monitor reported that the Act would make
35. Emphasis is added to the following quotations. Penny Bender, Bill Targets Sex As-
saultsAs Civil Rights Violation, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 25, 1993, at 7 (reporting that
the "provision would make crimes such as rape and sexual assault civil rights viola-
tions, so they could be prosecuted federally"); Penny Bender, Panel Rips Law's View of
Rape; Biden Backs Protection Act, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 28, 1993, at 28 (stating that
the bill "would make rape a crime of bias, entitling rape victims to sue their attackers
for civil rights violations"); Crime-Bill, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 7, 1993, at 3 (reporting
the bill would "elevate sexual assaults to the level of civil rights offenses"); Mitchell
Locin, Everyone Wants a Piece of Crime Bill, CHI. TRIn., June 23, 1994, at NI (re-
porting that the "measure would ... classify violence against women as a civil rights
violation"); Lopez, supra note 30 ("The bill would make a sex crime a civil rights vio-
lation, enabling the victim to sue for damages."); Leslie Phillips, Bill Takes Aim at
Crime Against Women, USA TODAY, Apr. 10, 1991, at 4A [hereinafter Phillips, Bill
Takes Aim] ("Rapes, domestic beatings, and other violent crimes against women
would be classified as civil rights violations under a proposal expected to pass a Senate
committee Thursday."); Leslie Phillips, Crime Bill's Provision Targets Women's Issues,
USA TODAY, July 27, 1994, at 3A [hereinafter Phillips, Crime Bills Provision] (report-
ing that the bill "includes civil rights protection for victims of gender crimes"); Phil
Reeves, Wife Cuts to Heart of the Problem, THE INDEP. (London), Aug. 11, 1993, at 9
(stating the Act would "classify rape and wife-beating as potential civil rights viola-
tions"); Pat Swift, Funding the Dreams of Female Candidates on State, Local Levels,
BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 9, 1993, Lifestyles, at 9, LEXIS, News & Business, News, The
Buffalo News (reporting that the remedy would "classify 'gender-motivated' violence
as a civil rights violation").
36. Sharon Schmickle, Simpson Case Gives Urgency to Crime Bill, STAR TaRn. (Minneapo-
lis, MN), June 23, 1994, at 1A (stating the Act "would allow victims of crimes
motivated by gender to sue for damages or court-ordered injunctions, essentially
making them civil rights cases in federal civil courts") (emphasis added).
37. Emphasis is added to the following quotations. Marcus, supra note 30, at A9 (report-
ing that the bill would "extend civil rights protection to victims of sex-related crimes so
that they could seek compensatory and punitive damages in federal courts"); Loraine
O'Connell, There is No Typical 'Profile' of Men Who Abuse Loved Ones, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, June 23, 1994, at Al (reporting the Act would "give civil rights protection
to women who face gender-based violence"); Violence Stalks Women Over 65, New
Report Says, DENY. POST, June 29, 1994, at 2F (saying the Act "establishes civil-rights
protections for victims of gender-based assaults"); Barbara Vobejda, Battered Women's
Cry Relayed Up From Grass Roots, WASH. POST, July 6, 1994, at Al (stating that the
bill would "create a new category of civil rights protection, allowing women to sue an
attacker if they were victimized because of their sex").
38. Meagan McGovern, Violence Against Women Act is Endorsed, Hous. CHRON., July
16, 1994, at 31 (reporting VAWA would "create a civil rights remedy for women who
are victims of crime") (emphasis added).
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gender-based crimes a violation of "a woman's civil rights. ' 39 The New
York Times and the St. Louis-Dispatch said that under the law, gender-
based violence would be a "federal civil rights violation,"4 and the
Boston Globe said victims would be able to sue under a "federal civil
rights statute."'" The St. Petersburg Times and the Baltimore Sun both
said that the law made gender-based assaults a violation of "federal civil
rights laws."" Newsday said that the bill would give "federal civil rights
protections, '43 and the Dallas Morning News said that the VAWA bill
made "abuse a federal civil rights offense.""
39. Scott Armstrong, Colorado Offers Answers On Domestic Violence, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, July 19, 1994, at 3 (stating "the act would make gender-biased crimes a
violation of a woman's civil rights") (emphasis added).
40. Maureen Balleza, Many Rape Victims Finding Justice Through Civil Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1991, at Al (stating that the remedy "would make sexual assault a
Federal civil rights violation") (emphasis added); Robert L. Koenig, Women at Risk,
Burris Testifies Tougher Federal Law Is Needed to Combat Sex, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Apr. 10, 1991, at ]A (stating the Act would "make sexual assault a federal
civil-rights violation") (emphasis added).
41. Bob Hohler, Pressure Builds for Bill to Counter Domestic Violence, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 29, 1994, at 12 (saying the bill would "permit abuse victims to sue their assail-
ants under a federal civil rights statute") (emphasis added); see also Ethan Bronner, The
Senate Panel to Address Rising Reports of Rape, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 11, 1991, at 3
(reporting the Act "would allow victims to bring civil rights lawsuits") (emphasis
added).
42. Emphasis is added to the following quotations. Roger Simon, Women Among Casual-
ties of Impasse on Crime Bill, BALT. SUN, July 20, 1994, at 2A (reporting the remedy
would "make 'gender based assaults' a violation of federal civil rights law"); Women
Urge Congress to Pass Protection Act, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 7, 1992, at 6A
("[T]he new law would make gender-based assaults a violation of federal civil rights
laws."); see also Bill Pushed to Help Abused Women, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 23,
1994, at I IA (reporting the bill would "give civil rights protection to women who face
gender-based violence."); Ann LoLordo & Bruce Reid, Tragedy May Raise Awareness
ofAbuse, BALT. SUN, June 19, 1994, at 17A ("[D]omestic violence against women has
been established as a civil rights violation.").
43. Newsday said the bill would give 'federal civil rights protections" and noted that it was
the "civil rights provision, modeled on laws prohibiting crimes based on race, that has
brought out strong opposition." Jack Sirica, Federal Protection of Women at Issue,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 16, 1992, at 17 (emphasis added).
44. Emphasis is added to the following quotations. Steve McGonigle & Anne Reifenberg,
House Rejects Debate on Crime Package, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 12, 1994, at
IA ("[The Act] makes abuse afederalcivil rights offense."); Quick Hits, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, June 8, 1994, at 5C (reporting the remedy "will make crimes against
women civil rights violations"); Anne Reifenberg, Brady Bill Dies in Senate; Chamber
Passes Anti-crime Package that Increases Police, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Nov. 20,
1993, at Al (stating the Act would "permit federal civil rights suits to be filed on be-
half of victims of crimes motivated by gender"); Barbara Whitaker, A battered Woman
Decides to Test the System, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 29, 1994, at IC ("The law
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Some articles also reported that the remedy defined rape or
domestic violence as a "hate crime." The Boston Globe said that the Act
would "define rape as a hate crime,"45 and the Star Tribune reported that
the Act "would designate domestic violence and rape as hate crimes that
would be prosecuted as violations of women's civil rights."46 The
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette said that the law "treats gender-based violence as
a hate crime and civil-rights offense."47 The New York Times said that
the remedy "would declare rape a 'hate crime' based on sex bias and
allow victims to bring private civil rights lawsuits against their
attackers."4 The Washington Post said, "Biden's bill would declare that
rape is a 'bias' or 'hate' crime and provide civil rights remedies for
victims."49 The Los Angeles Times similarly reported that the provision
"declares that rape is a 'bias' or 'hate' crime that violates federal civil
rights law."50
As discussed above, the civil rights remedy was modified before it
was enacted, first by expanding it to include non-sex related crimes, and
then by adding various limitations and eliminating the presumption
that all cases of rape and sexual assault were covered." Even after the
definition was changed, however, a number of articles said simply that
the remedy was for victims of "sexual assault"52 without mentioning that
stipulates that a person who deprives another of a civil right through violence moti-
vated by gender is liable to the injured person.").
45. Bronner, supra note 41, at 3.
46. Karin Winegar, Ms. Editor Wages War on Domestic Violence, STAR TRIB. (Minnea-
polis), Oct. 19, 1994, at IE.
47. Yvonne Barlow, First Case in Violence Against Women Law Goes to Trial, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, May 17, 1995, at B8.
48. Tamar Lewin, Tougher Laivs Mean More Cases Are Called Rape, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
1991, at 8.
49. Judy Mann, How Do We Handle the Rapist-Turned-Heartthrob?, WASH. POST, Mar.
20, 1991, at D3; see also Michael Isikoff, Record Number of Rapes Reported in U.S. in
'90, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1991, at A3 (reporting that the remedy would "define
rape as a 'hate' crime, thereby allowing victims to bring civil rights suits against assail-
ants"); Judy Mann, New Age, Old Myths, WASH. POST, July 26, 1991, at C3 ("Sen.
Joseph Biden (D-Del.) is sponsoring the Violence Against Women Act, which would
put rape into the category of hate and bias crimes.").
50. Panel Oks BillMaking Rape a 'Hate' Crime, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1991, at A4, LEXIS,
News & Business, News, L.A. Times; see also Lynn Smith, Facing the Issue Head-On,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1995, at El (reporting that the law "allows female victims of
violence to define rape and battery as a hate crime and to sue for damages in federal
court").
51. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Balleza, supra note 40 (stating that the remedy "would make sexual assault a
Federal civil rights violation"); Koenig, supra note 40 (reporting the Act would "make
sexual assault a federal civil-rights violation").
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victims of non-sexual, gender-based crime could also sue. Few articles
specified that the provision might not cover all cases of sexual assault.
Most articles about the civil rights remedy mentioned the provision in
passing, while describing the rest of the crime bill, and did not examine
the scope of the remedy in greater depth.
Only a few articles considered the scope of the remedy in any
depth. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch described the remedy as part of an
ongoing effort to redefine rape. The paper said that the "change in the
legal definition of rape is part of an evolution in the nation's courtrooms
that has mirrored the evolution in society's understanding of the
crime."" The Post-Dispatch continued: "Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., D-
Del., chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, is trying to lay the
groundwork for the next step in this legal change. His Violence Against
Women Act would, for the first time, give federal civil rights protection
to those assaulted because of their gender."54
A few papers talked about the possible limitations on the remedy's
coverage. These papers described the "animus" language, of the 1993
negotiated compromise, as requiring the victim to show that the attack
was motivated by "hatred" of women. In fact, the remedy did not
require a showing of hatred or animosity against women in general.
Instead, it required only a showing that the victim was targeted because
of her gender, or that the defendant acted with a specific intent or
purpose, based on the victim's gender, to injure the victim.55 The St.
Petersburg Times reported that, "[a]lthough that provision would not
apply to most domestic violence incidents, it would allow a woman to
collect civil damages after proving that a crime was motivated
specifically by a hatred of women."56 Newsday said the bill would "give
federal civil rights protections to some female victims of violent crime.,
57
Newsday was one of the only papers to recognize that men could also use
the remedy. The paper said that, "[i]n fact, the bill would allow both
men and women to sue for gender-bias crimes. But more women would
be expected to take advantage of the civil-court provisions since,
53. William H. Freivogel, New Attitude Changes Definition of Rape, ST. Louis PosT-
DISPATCH, Apr. 28, 1991, at lB.
54. Id.
55. See S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 64 (1993); see also Nourse, supra note 15, at 29-32 (dis-
cussing the meaning of the "animus" requirement).
56. Women Urge Congress to Pass Protection Act, ST. pETFSBURG TIMES, Feb. 7, 1992, at
6A.
57. Sirica, supra note 43, at 17 (emphasis added).
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historically, they have been more likely to be victims of gender-related
assaults."58 Newsday continued:
Some feminists maintain that all rapes are motivated by hatred
of women, and in time they could try to prove that in court.
But under the bill, a rape victim would have to prove that her
attacker had shown bias by deliberately seeking out a female
victim, using excessive force, mutilating the victim or express-
ing his hatred of women during the crime. 9
B. Litigation Press Coverage
1. The Court's Decision
Although virtually all of the newspapers describing the VAWA
provision between 1990 and 1995 (when the Act was before Congress)
called the remedy a civil rights law, very few articles reported in May
2000 that the Supreme Court had struck down a civil rights law.6" A
number of articles quote NOWLDEF as saying that the decision was a
"set-back for civil rights;" however, very few reporters themselves de-
scribed the provision as a "civil rights law." After the Court's decision,
NOWLDEF tried to categorize the remedy as a civil rights law (as Con-
gress had done), but reporters called it a "civil remedy" or a "rape law."
The following quotations provide examples of newspapers that did
not call the provision a "civil rights remedy" or say that the Court had
thrown out a civil rights law. The Chicago Sun-Times said the Court
ruled that Congress had "overstepped its power when it gave women the
right to sue their attackers in federal courts."'" The Chicago Tribune
reported that the Court "ruled that the federal government improperly
intruded on matters traditionally handled by the states when it allowed
58. Roni Rabin, New Grounds for Suing: Federal Bill Would Allow Lawsuits in Gender-bias
Crimes, NEWSDAY, Aug. 4, 1994, at A4, LEXIS, News & Business, News, Newsday.
59. Id.
60. I begin with a discussion of articles reporting on the Court's decision in Morrison to
highlight the contrast between the language used to describe the remedy in these arti-
cles with the language used in articles reporting on the provision when it was before
Congress. I look at reports by major newspapers on the Supreme Court's decision in
Morrison.
61. Joan Biskupic, High Court Throws Out Right to Sue Rapists, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May
16, 2000, at 19.
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rape victims to sue their attackers for damages in federal court. '12 The
Christian Science Monitor said that the Court "overturned a key portion
of a federal law that empowered victims of gender-based violence to sue
their attackers in federal court for civil damages,"63 and the Columbus
Dispatch reported that the Court "struck down a law that allowed
victims of rape and other gender-motivated attacks to sue their assailants
in federal court."64 The Hartford Courant said that the Court "struck
down a federal law that allowed victims of sex-related violence to sue
their attackers in federal court., 65 The Houston Chronicle reported that
the Court "struck down a U.S. law that permitted rape and domestic-
violence victims to sue their attackers in federal court. 66 Newsday
described the Court as ruling that "Congress trampled on states' rights
when it passed the Violence Against Women Act allowing rape victims
to sue their attackers in federal court., 67 The St. Louis Post-Dispatch
reported that, " [r]ape victims cannot sue their attackers for civil damages
in federal court, the Supreme Court ruled ... it is up to the states-not
Congress-to decide to give such help to women victimized by
violence.,
68
Although most newspapers did not report that the Court had
struck down a "civil rights law" or a law called "the civil rights remedy,"
there were a few exceptions. The Baltimore Sun reported that, "[p]utting
strict new limits on Congress' power to protect civil rights and crime
victims, the Supreme Court struck down.., a key provision of a federal
law that gave women who have been raped the right to sue their
attackers.... The ruling marked the third time in three years that the
court has found a federal civil rights law unconstitutional."" The Dallas
Morning News said that Christy Brzonkala, the petitioner in the case
62. Jan Crawford Greenburg, High Court Ruling Further Clips the Role of Congress, CHI.
TRIB., May 16, 2000, at 1.
63. Warren Richey, Court Curtails Power of Congress, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 16,
2000, at 1, LEXIS, News & Business, News, The Christian Science Monitor.
64. Roger K. Lowe, Victims of Sexual Assaults Lose Clout; 1994 Law Struck Down, Co-
LUMBUS DISPATCH, May 16, 2000, at Al.
65. Remez, supra note 31.
66. Steve Lash, Court Rejects U.S. Law on Rape Victims: Says Congress Went Too Far,
Hous. CHRON., May 16, 2000, at 1.
67. Gaylord Shaw, High Court: Rape Cases Belong on State Level- 5-4 Ruling Eliminates
Victims' U.S. Civil Suits, NEWSDAY (New York, NY) May 16, 2000, at A4.
68. Court Limits Suits By Rape Victims Against Attackers; 5-4 Vote Advances States' Rights
vs. Federal Government; Decision Angers Women ' Groups, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH,
May 16, 2000, ar A1, LEXIS, News & Business, News, St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
69. Lyle Den niston, Women Can't Sue Rapists, Court Says; Justices Strike Down Key Part of
Violence Against Women Act, BALT. SUN, May 16, 2000, at ]A, LEXIS, News &
Business, News, The Baltimore Sun (emphasis added).
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before the Supreme Court, "went to federal court ... under the civil-
rights section of the Violence Against Women Act. It permitted women to
sue for crimes 'motivated by gender,' such as domestic abuse and
rape."70 The Toronto Star reported that, "[a] sharply divided U.S.
Supreme Court has struck down a law that lets rape and other domestic-
violence victims sue their attackers in federal court for violating their
civil rights, ruling that Congress exceeded its powers in enacting the
measure."7' Notably, the title of this article was "U.S. Rape Victims Lose
Civil Rights Case." This Canadian newspaper appears to be the only
paper, reporting on the Court's decision, to use the words "civil rights"
in the title of its article about the decision.
Because they are void of civil rights language, the descriptions of
the civil rights remedy by most articles in May 2000 were a sharp con-
trast to articles describing the remedy from 1990 to 1995. When and
why did the press move from describing the provision as a civil rights
law to calling it a civil remedy? The next Section traces reporting on the
remedy by seven widely-circulated papers from after the enactment of
VAWA through the Court's decision.
2. Coverage Before the Court's Decision
7 2
a. The Richmond Times Dispatch
The Richmond Times Dispatch first reported on the Brzonkala case
when it was before the district court, and it described the VAWA
provision as a civil rights law. The paper said, VAWA "allows rapes
based on gender bias to be treated as civil rights cases."7 Articles in the
paper consistently used the phrase "civil rights" to describe the law:
"The Justice Department said it intends to defend the constitutionality
70. David Jackson, Justices Reject Federal Law Letting Women Sue Rapists 5-4 Ruling Con-
tinues Trend Favoring States' Rights, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 16, 2000, at IA,
LEXIS, News & Business, News, The Dallas Morning News (emphasis added).
71. U.S. Rape Victims Lose CivilRights Case, TORONTO STAR, May 16, 2000, at A15 (em-
phasis added).
72. From the period after the enactment of VAWA until the Supreme Court's decision in
Morrison, I review articles in six widely-circulated newspapers: USA Today, the Wall
Street Journal, the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and
the Chicago Tribune. I also look at articles in the Richmond Times Dispatch, a paper
that reported on the litigation of Christy Brzonkala's case as it developed.
73. John Hoke, NOW Wants to File Brief in Rape Suit; Federal Law at Stake in Virginia
Tech Case, RICH. TIMEs DISPATCH, Mar. 16, 1996, at B4.
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of the Violence Against Women Act, which allows victims of gender-
based sexual assaults to contend their civil rights were violated and seek
civil damages."74 The next month the paper said that VAWA "allows
sexual assault to be considered a violation of federally protected civil
rights."" The paper's report on the district court's opinion reflects the
reporter's confusion about the law: "Kiser's ruling also raises questions
about the future of the 2-year-old federal Violence Against Women Act,
that treats rape as a violation of a woman's constitutional rights, much
like a hate crime."" VAWA did not in fact treat rape as a violation of
constitutional rights, but rather created a statutory cause of action. Hate
crime laws are criminal statutes: they do not make crimes violations of
''constitutional rights."
The Richmond Times Dispatch continued for several years to use the
phrase "civil rights" to describe the law. In 1997, the paper said that the
law "permits federal civil rights lawsuits for sexual assault and domestic
violence cases." 77 In 1998, the paper said that the provision "makes gen-
der-motivated crimes a civil rights issue. 7 1 In 1999, the Dispatch said
that the provision "makes crimes motivated by the victim's sex a civil
rights matter that can be litigated in the federal courts. Later that year
the paper reported that the "high court will review the constitutionality
of the act's provision that allows rape victims to sue their attackers in
federal courts by making crimes motivated by the victim's sex civil-
rights matters.,,8
After oral arguments in the case on January 11, 2000, however, the
paper stopped using the phrase "civil rights." An article on January 12,
2000 said that the law "allows the victim of a violent crime motivated
by the victim's sex to sue the alleged perpetrators in federal civil court."8'
The article quoted NOW describing the provision as a civil rights law
74. John Hoke, Justice Agency to Intervene in Tech Rape Case; Athlete's Constitutional Chal-
lenge Cited, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 26, 1996, at B5.
75. John Hoke, Justice Department, NOW Back Suit Against Tech Football Players, RICH.
TIMES DISPATCH, Apr. 27, 1996, at BI, LEXIS, News & Business, News, Richmond
Times Dispatch.
76. Bill Geroux, Suit Dismissed in Alleged Rape; Federal Law Ruled Unconstitutional,
RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, July 30, 1996, at Al.
77. Mark Johnson, An Uphill Battle; Domestic Violence Act Likely Will Be Found Unconsti-
tutional, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Dec. 7, 1997, at A6.
78. FullAppeals Court to Hear Tech Case, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 8, 1998, at C3.
79. Tom Campbell, Sex-Based Crimes Act is Voided; Ruling Stems From Ex- Tech Student's
Suit, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 6, 1999, at Al.
80. Tom Campbell, High Court Takes Appeal in Rape Case; Constitutionality of Victim's
Right to Sue is Issue, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Sept. 29, 1999, at Al.
81. Tom Campbell, Court Hears Rape Charges; Justices Voice Doubt Over "Violence" Stat-
ute, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 12, 2000, at BI.
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but did not itself describe the provision as a civil rights law as it had in
earlier articles.82 A February 2000 article said that the act "allows victims
of a violent crime motivated by the victim's sex to sue the alleged at-
tackers in federal court," and did not call the provision a civil rights
law.83 Finally, reporting on the Supreme Court's decision, the paper did
not mention that the Court struck down a civil rights law: "The Court,
on a 5-4 vote, said Congress usurped the states' rights to protect citizens
when it enacted the section of the Violence Against Women Act that
provided a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated vio-
lence."84 What was once called a "federal civil rights law" was now called
a "federal civil remedy."
A review of articles in other papers, such as the New York Times
and the Washington Post, reveals a similar trend. As discussed below,
most newspapers initially called the provision a civil rights law, but by
the time they reported on the Supreme Court's decision, this label was
missing.
b. The New York Times
The New York Times first reported in 1996 that a "Federal District
Court judge has upheld the constitutionality of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994, a Federal law that made crimes against the oppo-
site sex a violation of the victim's civil rights." 8' The Times further stated
that the "civil rights provision allows women-and men-to file civil
suits for crimes against the opposite sex.",8 6 In 1999, the New York Times
again used the phrase "civil rights": "A 1994 law that allows rape victims
to sue their attackers on grounds that their civil rights were violated was
declared unconstitutional today by the Federal appeals court".87 Nota-
bly, the headline of this article was "Court Voids Civil Rights Law on
Rape Victims."
82. Id.
83. Rex Bowman, Ex- Tech Student Settles; Alleged Rape Victim to Accept $75,000 in Suit
Against School, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 26, 2000, at B1.
84. Rex Bowman, Lawsuit on Rape Rejected; Victims Can't Sue Attackers in US. Courts,
Justices Say, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, May 16, 2000, at Al.
85. James Barron, Federal Judge Upholds Law on Violence Against Women, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 1996, at B4. The article referred to the district court's decision in Doe v.
Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
86. Id.
87. Court Voids Civil Rights Law on Rape Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1999, at A9.
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Later that year, the Times said that, "[t]he Court will hear at least
three other federalism cases in the next few months, including whether
Congress had authority to pass the Violence Against Women Act, giving
Federal courts jurisdiction to hear domestic violence cases that are tradi-
tionally matters of state court jurisdiction. 8. This reporter categorized
the activity regulated by the VAWA provision as "domestic violence"-
rather than civil rights-and then reported that such activity was "tradi-
tionally" a matter of state jurisdiction. After the Court's decision, the
New York Times said that the Court "invalidated a... provision of fed-
eral law that permitted victims of rape, domestic violence and other
crimes 'motivated by gender' to sue their attackers in federal court."8
The headline about the Supreme Court's decision was, "Women Lose
Right to Sue Attackers in Federal Court." When this is compared to the
1999 headline about the Fourth Circuit's decision, "Court Voids Civil
Rights Law on Rape Victims," the change in the paper's characterization
of the remedy is apparent.
c. The Washington Post
A 1998 Washington Post article said that the law "allows victims of
gender-based crimes to sue their attackers in federal court for civil rights
violations." '" A 1999 article reported: "A 1994 federal law that gave vic-
tims of rape and domestic violence the right to sue their attackers for
violating their civil rights is unconstitutional, a U.S. appeals court ...
ruled yesterday." The article further noted that the "Supreme Court also
has traditionally upheld civil rights laws under the commerce provisions
of the Constitution." 91 A later article, reporting that the Supreme Court
would hear the case, described the law as "permitting victims of gender-
based violence to win money damages in civil litigation." 2 A 2000 arti-
cle said that the law "allows women to file civil lawsuits for money
damages against their attackers."' 3 It stated that the question before the
Court was: "Did Congress have the authority to pass the act, involving
88. Linda Greenhouse, Age Bias Case in Supreme Court Opens a New Round on Federal-
ism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1999, at A25.
89. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: The Court on Federalism; Women Lose Right to
Sue Attackers in Federal Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2000, at Al.
90. U.S. Appeals Court to Hear Case Alleging Rape, WASH. PosT, Feb. 8, 1998, at B3.
91. Brooke A. Masters, Appeals Court Rejects Part Of Gender-Violence Act; U.S. Law Ruled
Invalid in Va. Rape Suit, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1999, at Al.
92. Joan Biskupic, Dispute May Test Power Of Congress; Court to Review Law On Gender
Violence, WASH. Posr, Sept. 29, 1999, at A3.
93. A Look At... The Rehnquist Court; In Their Sights, WASH. PosT, Jan. 9, 2000, at B3.
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itself in what traditionally had been a state matter?" 94 The Post, like the
New York Times, stated that the activity regulated by the provision was
traditionally a state issue without acknowledging the fact that its drafters
viewed the provision as regulating discrimination-a traditionally fed-
eral area of regulation. The Post, reporting on the Court's decision, did
not call the remedy a "civil rights law" as it had in earlier articles. In-
stead, it wrote: "A sharply divided Supreme Court struck down part of a
law crafted to help survivors of rape and domestic violence, ruling ...
that Congress overstepped its power when it gave women a right to sue
their attackers.
9 5
d. The Los Angeles Times
In 1999 the Los Angeles Times said, "[a] federal law that gave vic-
tims of rape and domestic violence the right to sue their attackers for
violating their civil rights is unconstitutional. '" 96 But later that year,
when the Court took the case, the paper said, "[t]he justices ... an-
nounced ... that they will decide the fate of the Violence Against
Women Act, a new type of hate-crime law that gives victims of sexual
assaults and batterings a right to sue their attackers for money dam-
ages. 97 Reporting on the Court's decision, The Los Angeles Times stated
that the Supreme Court, "rejecting the notion of national laws against
'hate crimes,' struck down a federal measure ... that gave battered
spouses and victims of rape and other sexual violence a right to sue their
attackers.""
e. The Wall Street Journal
Reporting on VAWA in 1996, the Wall Street Journal stated, "[t]he
act, which was passed by Congress as part of a 1994 crime bill, allows
victims of sexual assaults to contend that their civil rights were violated
94. Id.
95. Joan Biskupic, Justices Reject Lawsuits For Rape; Court Again Limits Congress's Power,
WASH. POST, May 16, 2000, at Al.
96. Court Restricts Rape Victims'Right to Sue, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1999, at A8.
97. David G. Savage, High Court to Rule on Rights of Grandparents, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29,
1999, at Al.
98. David G. Savage, High Court Rejects US. Law Allowing Civil Suits in Rapes, L.A.
TIMES, May 16, 2000, at Al.
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and seek damages." 99  In 1999, the Wall Street Journal again
characterized the Act as protecting civil rights: "The Violence Against
Women Act was struck down by a federal appeals court .... The
decision may lead to a Supreme Court review of the 1994 law letting
rape victims sue for civil-rights violations."'00 In 1999, however, the
paper printed an inaccuracy, saying that the remedy had made gender-
based violence a "federal crime." The paper reported: "Now, the court
may use the 1994 Violence Against Women Act, which established
gender-based violence as a federal crime, to further define its views on
how far Congress may go to regulate noneconomic activity under the
Commerce Clause.'' 1.. In fact, the VAWA provision at issue in the
litigation created a civil cause of action for victims of gender-motivated
crimes to sue in federal court. It did not make such violence a federal
crime.'0 2 Finally, when reporting on the Supreme Court's decision, the
Wall Street Journal again inaccurately said that the remedy made gender-
based violence a federal crime: "In a decision written ... by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the majority ruled that Congress had exceeded its
constitutional authority by making gender-based violence a federal
crime.",
03
f. The Chicago Tribune
The Chicago Tribune also initially reported that the Brzonkala
litigation involved a civil rights law; however, the Tribune, like other
papers, did not use this language to describe the remedy when reporting
on the Supreme Court's decision. The Chicago Tribune reported in
1996, "a Virginia judge ruled unconstitutional a 1994 federal law
defining rape as a violation of civil rights and allowing victims to sue
their attackers."'0 4 In 1999, the paper reported that the "4th U.S.
99. What' News, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1996, at Al.
100. Whats News, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1999, at Al.
101. Robert S. Greenberger, High Court to Examine HMOs' Liability In Cases of Cost Cuts,
Patients'Health, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1999, at B18.
102. The 1994 Violence Against Women Act did contain some criminal provisions, in-
cluding federal criminal penalties for anyone who travels across state lines to violate a
protective order, 18 U.S.C. § 2262 (2000), or with intent to cause bodily harm to a
spouse or intimate partner, 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (2000). The constitutionality of these
statutes was not at issue in the litigation before the Supreme Court.
103. Robert S. Greenberger & Jackie Calmes, Next President Likely to Tip Balance of Su-
preme Court, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2000, at A36.
104. NRA Clout Stymies Bill On Stalking; Legal Moves to Protect Women Suffer Setbacks,
CM. TRIB., Aug. 18, 1996, at C8, LEXIS, News & Business, News, Chicago Trib-
une.
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Circuit Court of Appeals voted 7-4 to uphold a lower court's ruling
against the Violence Against Women Act, which allows women to sue
their sex attackers for damages in federal court for violating their civil
rights."' 5 Later in 1999, however, when reporting that the Court would
hear the case, the Chicago Tribune did not use civil rights language: "At
issue is a 1994 federal law called the Violence Against Women Act,
which allows rape victims to sue their attackers."' 6 A January 2000
article said that the Morrison case "goes to the heart of Congress' [sic]
authority to pass laws that infringe on traditional state concerns."'0 7 The
Chicago Tribune, like the New York Times and the Washington Post,
reported as a fact that VAWA infringed on traditional state matters,
rather than as an issue for debate. An article published later in January
2000 did, however, use the words "civil rights." In this article, the paper
described the remedy as giving "women the right to file civil rights
lawsuits against men who sexually attack them."'08 But the Chicago
Tribune dropped the "civil rights" label when reporting on the Court's
decision in May 2000 and said that the remedy "allowed rape victims to
sue their attackers for damages in federal court."'09
g. USA Today
Although USA Today called the VAWA provision a civil rights law
when it was enacted by Congress,'' ° the paper did not refer to it as a
civil rights remedy in its articles about the litigation of the provision's
constitutionality. In 1996, the paper reported that a Virginia judge
found that a "groundbreaking federal law that lets rape victims sue their
attackers for damages is unconstitutional.'. In 1999, the paper stated,
"[VAWA] lets women sue and recover punitive damages from their
105. Jean McNair, Gender-Based Violence Law Falls, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 21, 1999, at 8.
106. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Supreme Court in for Hectic Session; Justices Add More High-
Profile Cases to Crowded Calendar, CH. TRIB., Sept. 29, 1999, at Ni.
107. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Supreme Court Hears Arguments on Right of Victims to Sue
Rapists, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 12, 2000, at N8.
108. Gene Emery, Drugs Linked to Violence Against Women, CHi. TRIB., Jan. 26, 2000, at
9, LEXIS, News & Business, News, Chicago Tribune.
109. Jan Crawford Greenburg, High Court Ruling Further Clips the Role of Congress, CHI.
TRIB., May 16, 2000, at 1.
110. See Phillips, Crime Bill Provision, supra note 35.
111. Tony Mauro, Judge Throws Out Historic Rape Lawsuit, USA TODAY, July 30, 1996, at
1A.
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attackers if they can prove they were victimized because of their sex."1 12
In January 2000, the paper said that the law permitted "victims of
gender-based violence to sue in federal courts,"'1 3 and that "[tlhe case,
Brzonkala vs. Morrison, could permit the high court to continue to
define how far Congress can reach into areas traditionally left to the
states." Finally, when reporting on the Supreme Court's decision,
USA Today said, "[a] divided Supreme Court threw out a key women's-
rights law Monday, ruling that Congress exceeded its constitutional
authority when it allowed rape victims to bypass state judicial systems
and sue their alleged assailants in federal court."" 5
C Conclusions About the Press Coverage
Why didn't the name "civil rights remedy" stick? Many of the
newspapers discussed above used the words "civil rights" to describe the
law up until around the time the Court took the case; yet very few
newspapers reported that the Court had struck down a civil rights law.
After the Court took the case, a number of newspapers characterized the
provision as an example of Congress "involving itself' or "infringing" on
an area "traditionally" left to the states. Newspapers reported this as a
fact rather than an issue for debate. The change in the language that
newspapers used to describe the remedy, and the way that articles
framed the issue before the Court, could reflect the success of a cam-
paign by lawyers for defendants and members of conservative groups to
shift the emphasis towards states' rights and away from the civil rights
concepts behind the VAWA provision. '
Reporters writing about the Court's decision may also have been
influenced by the language that the Court used in its opinion. The
Supreme Court did not call the remedy a "civil rights remedy"-the
name that Congress gave-but instead referred to it as "Section 13981."
The Court began its opinion, "[iln these cases we consider the
112. Tony Mauro, Court will Review Laws of Protection: Validity of Safeguards for Women,
Clinics Challenged, USA TODAY, Sept. 29, 1999, at 4A.
113. Richard Willing, Court: States are Exempt from Federal Age-bias Law; Justices Question
Validity of Violence Against Women Act, USA TODAY, Jan. 12, 2000, at 6A.
114. Richard Willing, Case Could Redefine Reach of Congress, USA TODAY, Jan. 11, 2000,
at 4A.
115. Richard Willing, Court Rejects Rape Law, USA TODAY, May 16, 2000, at IA.
116. See, e.g., infra notes 136-43, 188-90 and accompanying text (statements of commen-
tators arguing against categorizing violence against women as discrimination); see also
infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text (commentators arguing VAWA provision
improperly intruded on state matters).
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constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which provides a federal civil
remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence.""' 7 Most reporters
used the Court's categorization of the law as a "civil remedy" rather than
returning to the name Congress gave it.
The facts of the Morrison case also shaped the discourse about the
remedy. To the press, Morrison was a "rape case." For example, a head-
line in the Houston Chronicle read, "Court Rejects U.S. Law on Rape
Victims.""..8 The Chicago Sun-Times wrote, "High Court Throws Out
Right to Sue Rapists." 9 Newsday said, "High Court: Rape Cases Belong
on State Level,"' 2 and USA Today said, "Court Rejects Rape Law.
' 2
1
Papers saw that the alleged rape in the Morrison case qualified as "gen-
der-motivated" under the provision and did not consider further what
acts of violence would or would not be covered. The press's failure to
explain the meaning of "gender-motivated violence" may indicate that
reporters thought it was obvious that all acts of rape or sex-related vio-
lence would be considered "gender-motivated." But by stating that
Congress regulated "rape"-rather than explaining the definition of
"gender-motivated violence"-the articles distanced the violence from
the concept of discrimination. The concept of violence against women
as gender-based discrimination might have been novel to many readers.
Without an explanation of this concept, many readers likely would
think of a "rape law" as more closely connected to criminal law than
civil rights law. The press's failure to explore the concept of violence as
discrimination likely meant that much of the public did not conceptual-
ize the remedy as a discrimination law.
Had the constitutional question about the remedy not been pre-
sent, reporters might have explored the scope and meaning of the
remedy in greater depth as courts examined whether particular crimes
were indeed "gender-motivated." Perhaps because the constitutional
question appeared the most relevant, little attention was given to the
scope of the provision. But in fact, the concept of "gender-motivated"
violence did have constitutional implications. Under its recent categori-
cal approach to the Commerce Clause, the Court considered what it
viewed as "traditionally" state and "traditionally" federal in determining
117. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000).
118. Steve Lash, Court rejects U.S. law on rape victims, Hous. CHRON., May 16, 2000, at
1.
119. Joan Biskupic, High Court Throws Out Right to Sue Rapists, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May
16, 2000, at 19.
120. Gaylord Shaw, High Court: Rape Cases Belong on State Level/5-4 Ruling Eliminates
Victims' U.S. Civil Suits, NEWSDAY (New York, NY), May 16, 2000, at A4.
121. Willing, supra note 115.
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whether Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause powers. 122 Since the
Civil Rights era, combating discrimination has been a job for Congress,
whereas regulating rape has historically been a job for the states. As re-
vealed by the editorials and commentary described below, many viewed
the provision as a "criminal" law not a "civil rights" law, and, therefore,
as a matter for the states-not the federal government-to regulate. The
facts of the Morrison case, a rape case, shaped newspapers' reporting of
the remedy and shaped the public's understanding of the Court's deci-
sion. We can imagine how different the discourse about the remedy
would have been if, for example, the case litigated to the Supreme Court
had been similar to the Canadian case of a man shooting a number of
female engineering students instead of a rape on a college campus.
Finally, as an aside, it is worth noting that very few articles men-
tioned the race of Brzonkala (who is white) or the defendants (who are
black). The only mention of race came very early on in the development
of the case. 23 The press could have focused more attention on the issue
of race in this case, but, perhaps surprisingly, they did not. As discussed
below, a number of commentators did, however, discuss the issue of
124race.
122. See Resnik, supra note 13, at 620.
123. In 1996, the New York Times reported: "Because the men are black and she is white,
the case is caught in racial cross-currents that run as deep in Thomas Jefferson's state
as anywhere in the nation. But the vision of civil rights that shapes the lawsuit is col-
ored by sex, not race." Nina Bernstein, Civil Rights Lawsuit in Rape Case Challenges
Integrity ofa Campus, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1996, at 1. The Richmond Times Dispatch
never mentioned that the defendants were black. The Roanoke Times & World News
and the Virginian-Pilot mentioned this fact after the grand jury failed to indict in the
criminal case. The mention of race seems largely due to the statements made by de-
fendants' attorney, Joe Painter. The Roanoke Times & World News reported that
Painter "said he believed the rape allegations were based on racism. Brzonkala is white
and the three players are black." Jan Vertefeuille, Players are not Indicted; Ed-Tech
Student to Pursue Rape Claim in Federal Suit, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Apr.
11, 1996, at Al. The Virginian-Pilot reported that "Painter claimed ... that Brzon-
kala's case is racially motivated, saying it's 'no mere coincidence' that she is white and
the three football players are black." According to the paper, Painter said, "The cry of
rape along with images of African-American males pitted against a white female is ra-
cism at its most base level .... This case is not about violence against women; this
case is about money and race." GrandJury Declines to Indict Va. Tech Players; But the
Athletes StillFace a CivilSuit, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Apr. 11, 1996, at Al.
124. See infra notes 200-04, 247 and accompanying text.
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II. THE DEBATE IN THE PRESS
Next, I examine how debate about the civil rights remedy played
out in the press. In the previous Part, I examined "objective" articles
about the remedy. In this Part, I turn to commentary and editorial
pieces-pieces which seek to persuade rather than simply report."'
Before VAWA was enacted, eight papers expressed support for the
bill as a whole, or for the civil rights remedy in particular, 126 and six pa-
pers opposed the enactment of the civil rights remedy. 27 During the
litigation of the case, only one paper, the New York Times, supported
upholding the constitutionality of the provision, and seven opposed it. 2'
After the Supreme Court's decision, fourteen papers expressed opposi-
tion to the decision;'29 twenty-eight expressed support for the decision;'30
and one fell in between. 3' During the course of the litigation, several
125. I look at editorials in newspapers that appear in Lexis's "News Group File, All" data-
base, which includes over one thousand publications. I also look at opinion and
commentary pieces written by individuals that appear in the same database. Various
types of writers authored these pieces. Some commentators were regular columnists
who wrote about VAWA repeatedly in their columns. Other pieces were written by
individuals more directly connected to the remedy such as Senator Biden and other
members of Congress, individuals from NOWLDEF, and lawyers for the defendants
in the case.
126. USA Today, the Atlanta Journal and Constitution, the Christian Science Monitor, the
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, the New York Times, the Dallas Morning News, the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, and the Boston Globe.
127. These papers were the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, the Denver Rocky
News, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, the New Republic, and the News & Record (Greens-
boro, NC).
128. The Las Vegas Review-Journal, the Atlanta Journal and Constitution, the Richmond
Times Dispatch, the Herald-Sun (Durham, NC), the Washington Post, the Augusta
(GA), the News & Record (Greensboro, NC).
129. These papers included: the Ashley Park Press (Neptune, NJ), the Austin American-
Statesman, the Baltimore Sun, the Boston Globe, the Buffalo News, the Kansas City
Star, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, the New York Times, the Press Enterprise, the Record
(Bergen County, NJ), and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the San Francisco Chronicle, the
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, and the University Wire.
130. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, the Boston Herald, the Chicago Sun-Times, the
Chicago Tribune, the Christian Science Monitor, the Courier Journal (Louisville, KY),
the Denver Post, the Detroit News, the Herald Sun (Durham, NC), the Houston
Chronicle, the Las Vegas Review-Journal, the National Review, the News & Observer
(Raleigh, NC), the News & Record (Greensboro, NC), the News Tribune, the New
York Post, the Omaha World Herald, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, the Plain Dealer, the
Providence Journal-Bulletin, the Richmond Times Dispatch, the Seattle Times, the Sun
Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale, FL), the Tampa Tribune, the Tennessean, the Virginian-
Pilot (Norfolk, VA), the Washington Post, and the Washington Times.
131. The Los Angeles Times was the only paper to fall in between.
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papers switched sides: initially they supported the enactment of VAWA
but later they wrote in support of the Court's decision to strike down
the civil rights remedy.
132
In pieces written throughout the past decade, we can see commen-
tators fighting over how the civil rights remedy would be understood.
Some of these commentators were representatives of political organiza-
tions. Some were scholars. Others were lawyers for the parties in the
Morrison case, who acted as advocates in the courtroom and in the press.
The Supreme Court ultimately decided the issue in the courtroom, but
newspapers also acted as judges when deciding what side to take in their
editorials. Proponents of the remedy lost not only in the Court but also
in the press. One could imagine editorial outrage at the decision; in-
stead, most editorials embraced the Court's decision.
The examination of the debate in the press is divided into three
time periods; this examination is further divided between editorials and
commentary and the types of arguments made for and against the provi-
sion. Part A examines the debate about the provision in the press when
Congress considered and enacted VAWA. Part B considers the time pe-
riod beginning when the litigation of Morrison began and continuing up




There were several areas of disagreement about the civil rights rem-
edy before it was enacted. There were two major axes of debate. First,
commentators argued about the "rights" at stake. Members of Congress
and individuals from NOW, among others, wrote commentary to
gather support for the enactment of the provision, arguing that the
rights of women were at stake. Several widely-published columnists,
however, argued that the provision undermined the rights of men,
criminal defendants, and minorities. Both sides of this debate used the
132. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution and the Christian Science Monitor expressed
general support for the enactment of VAWA (without specifically opposing the civil
rights remedy) but later supported the Court's decision to strike down the civil rights
remedy. See Safe at Home? Not U.S. Women, infra note 162 (supporting VAWA);
High Court Wisely Keeps Limits on Federal Authority, infra note 311 (supporting the
Court's decisi6n to strike down the civil rights provision); see Domestic Violence, infra
note 163 (supporting VAWA); The Court Draws a Line, infra note 321 (supporting
the Court's decision).
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language of civil rights and discrimination. The second major area of
disagreement was whether the federal government's role in regulating
the violence was appropriate. Commentators who supported the Act
framed the law as regulating civil rights and discrimination and said that
the federal role in this realm was appropriate and needed. Others de-
scribed the provision as regulating crime or domestic relations; they
then claimed that the federal courts should not be burdened with these
matters or intervene in areas of traditional state concern. The following
sections describe in greater depth the debate about the bill before it was
enacted.
a. Discrimination Claims
Before the enactment of VAWA, commentators debated whether
some forms of violence against women are discriminatory and should
therefore be classified as civil rights violations. They disagreed about
whether the civil rights remedy provided needed rights to victims of vio-
lence or undermined the rights of men.
NOW was a strong proponent of the civil rights remedy-it lob-
bied Congress to enact the remedy, and NOWLDEF later defended the
remedy's constitutionality by representing Christy Brzonkala. Helen
Neuborne of NOWLDEF argued that crimes of rape and domestic vio-
lence affect women as a class: "The provision says something many
don't want to admit: Violence against women is often motivated by a
person's gender and not by individual circumstances. That is why many
more women are raped than men." '133 According to Neuborne:
There are countless examples of how women-as a class-live
differently than men do because of the threat of violence based
solely on their gender.
Violence motivated by gender is not merely an individual
crime or personal injury but a form of brutal discrimination,
and assault on a publicly shared ideal of equality. When half of
our citizens are not safe at home or in the streets because of
133. Helen Neuborne, Editorial, Mere Talk Won't Make Life Any Saferfor Women, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993, at B7 (Ms. Neuborne is the former director of NOWLDEF).
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their sex, all of society suffers. This is clearly a civil rights is-
134
sue.
Several Representatives of Congress also wrote pieces arguing that
crimes committed because of a victim's gender should be treated in the
same way as crimes committed because of racial or ethnic hatred.
135
Others, however, opposed the enactment of the remedy. Several
widely-published columnists argued against the classification of acts of
rape and domestic violence as discrimination. According to Columnist
Cathy Young:
When a violent man channels his aggression into a sexual act,
he is likely to target a woman if his sexual impulses are di-
rected toward women .... In this sense, the claim that
"women are raped because they are women" is true; but it is
also true that victims of car theft are targeted because they
have cars. If rape is inherently directed at women as a gender,
how do we explain sexual assaults on men and boys?"3 6
John Leo, another columnist who consistently opposed classifying forms
of violence against women as civil rights violations, advanced a similar
theory. Leo, like Young, thought that men tend to rape women because
134. Id.
135. Senator Biden said, "[w]e must treat gender-based assaults on women as violations of
their civil rights" and "condemn them under federal law as we do racial attacks on
blacks or violent prejudice against Jews." Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-DE), Editorial,
Combating Aggression at Home, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Mar. 3, 1991, at H7. Elea-
nor Holmes Norton (D-D.C.) said:
[VAWA continues] a course Congress has already begun: to bring women
under civil rights protections similar to those blacks won as a result of the
Civil War .... Violence against a black by a white is sometimes, but not
always, a civil rights violation. The same is true of violence by a man
against a woman. The civil rights concept is precisely what makes the new
federal remedy self-limiting and unlikely to overwhelm the courts.
Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-D.C.), Editorial, Federalizing Feminism; Protection of the
Civil Rights of Women Against Criminal Attacks Needs the Force of Federal Law, RE-
CORDER, Aug. 11, 1994, at 8, LEXIS, News & Business, News, Recorder. See also
Connie Morella, Editorial, It's No Fun When Violence Becomes a Game, CHI. TRIB.,
June 20, 1993, at 11 ("For the first time in our history, crimes committed because of
gender will be treated in the same way as crimes committed because of racial, reli-
gious or ethnic hatred."). Connie Morella was one of the sponsors of VAWA.
136. Cathy Young, Gender Poisoning In the Bobbitt Era, Facing the Real Truth About Male
Violence, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1994, at C5. Cathy Young is a contributing editor at
REASON magazine; her columns are published throughout the country in a number of
sources.
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of their sexual orientation: "Heterosexual rapists attack women (as op-
posed to a nondiscriminatory target group of 50 percent males and 50
percent females) because of their sexual orientation, not because they
arbitrarily decide to single out just one of our two leading genders." '37
Leo wrote, "[t]o bring rape and wife beating under the umbrella of civil-
rights protection, it is necessary to argue that these are acts of prejudice
and discrimination, like denying someone a job on the basis of race or,,138
sex. But according to Leo, they "clearly aren't, which is why all the
verbal and logical gymnastics are required."'39 Leo contended, "[w]e are
a long way here from the original model of civil-rights legislation: The
long oppression of blacks by whites, based clearly on discrimination and
nothing else."'
40
Leo also argued that it would be difficult to distinguish between
violence that would fit under the VAWA provision and violence that
would not. He said, "[t]his approach would bog courts down in analysis
of biased attitudes .... Like medieval theologians trying to classify an-
gels, authorities would have to spend a lot of time classifying animuses,
deciding which rapist's animus was particular and which was generalized
and aimed at all women.' 4' Then, according to Leo, "different punish-
ments would be dolled out in different courts on the basis of elaborate
guesswork." 42 Ruth Shalit, writing for the New Republic, was also highly
critical of the remedy and the idea of inquiring into the motives and
thoughts of attackers. Shalit pointed out the potential harm in distin-
guishing between "types" of rape. She wrote, "[b]y elevating motive over
deed, anti-rape activists threaten to subvert their movement's main
premise: that rapes are crimes of violence; that no rapes are 'better' or
'worse' than others."'43 Shalit said, "[b]y asking politicians and juries to
make difficult distinctions between 'terrible' and 'much worse' rapes,
the gender feminists are in danger of reifying the very value judgments
the date-rape movement sought to eviscerate. '
Those who opposed the remedy also argued that violence is a gen-
der-based problem; but according to these writers, it is men, not
137. John Leo, Rape is Not an Act of Bias, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 8, 1990, at 25.




141. John Leo, Radical Feminism in the Senate, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 19, 1993,
at 19.
142. Id.
143. Ruth Shalit, Caught in the Act, NEW REPUBLIC, July 12, 1993, at 12.
144. Id.
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women, who are the subjects of greater abuse. For example, Cathy
Young said, "[i]n one sense, it is a 'gendered' problem: Most violent of-
fenders (nearly 90 percent) are men. And so, though in lesser
proportion, are most victims. ' Young continued, "over 2 million men
a year are assaulted by wives or girlfriends. And the women aren't just
striking back; they are as likely as men to be the aggressors, often using
weapons to make up for their physical disadvantage." '146 A letter from
the Chairman of the Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts for the
National Coalition of Free Men put forth a similar theory in a letter to
the Washington Times: "Apparently Mr. Biden has not heard of our con-
stitutional right to equal protection of the law and/or he approves of
violence against men-the majority of victims of murder and violent
crime."' These claims about the equal protection rights of men mirror
"reverse discrimination" claims made by whites in the affirmative action
context.
Some columnists criticized the provision for undermining the civil
rights of defendants. For example, John Leo said that the provision
would "open the door to shakedowns based on a threat to sue for rape.
A weak allegation that would be dismissed quickly by a criminal prose-
cutor might suffice in civil court. (Many falsely accused men would
presumably pay off to avoid the publicity.)"'48 Columnist Tom Teepen
complained that under the provision "[e]ven suspects who never were
charged and defendants who had been acquitted could be tried or re-
tried under the civil courts' lower threshold of proof."'49
Columnists also disagreed over whether or not the remedy would
promote the rights of women at the expense of the rights of minori-
ties."'5 The ACLU spoke out against the remedy in Congress saying that
the provision:
145. Young, supra note 136.
146. Id. Young said in a later piece that the remedy "defines many crimes against women
as federal civil-rights offenses and allocates federal funds to areas with the highest
rates of crime against women. Yet nearly 65 percent of violent-crime victims and 75
percent of homicide victims are male." Cathy Young, Man Troubles: Making Sense of
the Men : Movement, REASON, July 1994, at 18-19.
147. Jon R. Ryan, Has Sen. Joseph Biden Heard of Equal Protection of the Law?, WASH.
TIMES, May 1, 1994, at B2.
148. Leo, supra note 141.
149. Tom Teepen, Editorial, Push for Gender-Based Civil Suits is Misguided, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Apr. 18, 1994, at A7. Based in Atlanta, Tom Teepen is a na-
tional correspondent for Cox Newspapers.
150. Law Professor Jenny Rivera questioned the effectiveness of the civil rights remedy for
women of color. Rivera pointed out that access to the courts "continues to be a major
obstacle for women of color," and that the legal system has "not always served as a
positive vehicle for reform with respect to the struggles of women of color." Rivera
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might ... adversely affect other civil rights lawsuits (including
statutory claims and constitutional challenges) because of its
impact on the federal courts. By creating a new federal civil
cause of action, it will generate a series of new cases for the
federal courts, whose dockets are already swelled by the in-
crease in criminal (mostly drug-related) matters."'
The Dallas Morning News noted the ACLU's complaints and the oppo-
sition of some lawmakers to the remedy. It wrote, "[l]ike the ACLU,
these lawmakers ... feared that by establishing a new cause of civil ac-
tion with a standard open to interpretation, they might be creating
difficulties for other civil rights lawsuits."'1
52
b. Federal/State Jurisdiction
Commentators also debated whether gender-motivated violence
should be regulated at the state or federal level. Before the enactment of
VAWA, and before the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Lopez"' limited Congress's commerce power, debate among columnists
focused on the policy reasons for state or federal jurisdiction rather than
said that many women of color "do not have even sufficient financial resources to
provide for their basic needs" and pointed out that "batterers who would be the sub-
jects of these lawsuits" are not "deep-pocket defendants." Rivera said the "incentive to
sue an abuser is even lower when, as is true for many women, the abuser provides the
only, or a necessary portion of, the family's income." Jenny Rivera, The Violence
Against Women Act and the Construction of Multiple Consciousness in the Civil Rights
and Feminist Movements, 4 J.L. & PoL'Y 463, 498-500 (1996). Arguments of the type
Rivera makes, however, did not appear in any newspaper commentary written about
VAWA.
151. Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing on H.R. 1133 before the Subcomm. On Civil
and Constitutional Rights ofthe House Judiciary Comm., 103rd Cong. 51, at 22 (1993)
(statement of Elizabeth Symonds, ACLU).
152. Anne Reifenberg, Domestic-violence Measure May Face Legislative Hurdles; Bill Popu-
lar, butACLU, Others Say it's Too Vague, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 31, 1993, at
IA.
153. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lopez a five-person majority held unconstitutional a federal
criminal statute permitting prosecution of individuals alleged to possess guns within
1000 feet of a schoolyard. The Court held that there was insufficient evidence in the
congressional record that guns in schoolyards "substantially affected" interstate com-
merce and thus held that Congress had exceeded its Commerce Clause power in
enacting the statute. The Lopez decision was the first time since 1936 that the Court
found Congress had exceeded its Commerce Clause limits. See Charles Fried, The Su-
preme Court, 1994 Term Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARv. L. REv. 13, 15 (1995).
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what was constitutionally permissible. Through this debate, commenta-
tors revealed differing perceptions of the federal courts.
Some members of Congress who supported the remedy wrote
commentary declaring the appropriateness of the federal role. Senator
Biden wrote, "[p]rosecuting such cases in federal court sends a strong
message that this country finally will treat family violence as a matter of
public justice and no longer dismiss it as a private, personal matter...
This is a major step forward in putting everyone on notice that we are
finally taking violence against women seriously." '154 Representative Elea-
nor Holmes Norton (D-D.C.) defended the federal role, stating that the
"provisions punishing gender-based violence against women ... are in
keeping with the responsibility of the federal courts to protect civil
rights." '155 Helen Neuborne of NOWLDEF explained that states had
failed in this area and that a federal solution was needed. She wrote,
"[w]hat makes the Violence Against Women Act so effective in attack-
ing the problem is its status as federal legislation. Without the Violence
Against Women Act, women are still subject to loopholes in state laws
that don't offer fair and full protection. '5
This view in support of the federal role was not, however, em-
braced by all. Columnists John Leo and James Kilpatrick, like the
ACLU, both argued that the provision would overload the federal
courts. Leo said that "[t]he bill further burdens an already bloated judi-
cial system."' 57 Kilpatrick argued that "the Senate will want to think
long and hard about the added burden the measure would place upon
federal courts that are overburdened already."'5 s
These quotations reveal commentators' varying perceptions of the
federal courts. 59 First, federal courts were seen as more "important"
154. Press Release, Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Biden Calls Implementation of Violence
Against Women Act "A Major Step Forward" (Mar. 21, 1995); see also 140 CONG.
REc. S6098 (daily ed. May 19, 1994) (statement of Sen. Biden) ("Most importantly,
Federal adjudication of these claims demonstrates the national commitment made to
eradicating discrimination. Only a Federal court can speak with the voice of the en-
tire Nation.").
155. Holmes Norton, supra note 135.
156. Neuborne, supra note 133.
157. Leo, supra note 141.
158. James J. Kilpatrick, Editorial, A Good Cause-But This is a Bad Law, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., May 7, 1993, at B6. James Kilpatrick is a Universal Press Syndicate
columnist from Charleston, S.C.
159. For more on the meaning of "federal," see Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction
as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARv. L. Rav. 924, 967-992
(2000). Resnik explores the evolution of attitudes about the identity of the federal
courts and the development of the concept of the federal courts as distinctive and
"superior" to state courts.
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than state courts. Senator Biden indicated this when he stated that plac-
ing the lawsuits in federal court was a way to send a message that
Congress was taking the violence seriously. On the other hand, colum-
nists, like Leo and Kilpatrick, and the ACLU viewed the federal courts
as "bloated," "swelled," and "burdened." They perceived the federal
courts as too busy for the type of violence that the VAWA provision
regulated. 60
Not surprisingly, in the pre-Lopez era, few commentators asserted
that Congress lacked the authority under the Commerce Clause to enact
the remedy. With the exception of Kilpatrick, 6' commentators did not
argue that the remedy was unconstitutional, just that it was inadvisable.
Although arguments that the provision was improper for the federal
courts were advanced initially only on policy grounds, these arguments
played a role later in the constitutional arguments against the provision.
Commentators claimed that the activity regulated by the provision
should be considered either criminal or family law, both of which they
then classified as exclusively state matters. These arguments laid the
groundwork for what became an essential part of the constitutional ar-
gument: the idea that Congress exceeded its power by infringing on an
area of "traditional" state and local concern.
2. Editorials
Newspapers were split in their support of the civil rights remedy
before it was enacted. Arguments made in newspaper editorials were
similar to arguments made by commentators.
Several newspaper editorials expressed support for VAWA as a
whole. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution wrote an editorial support-
ing VAWA. 1 2 The Christian Science Monitor expressed general support
160. Symonds of the ACLU noted that the federal court "dockets are already swelled by
the increase in criminal (mostly drug-related) matters." Symonds, supra note 151, at
22.
161. James J. Kilpatrick argued: "[T]his part of the bill rests upon a flimsy foundation of
constitutional justification.... [This] is constitutional hokum, and Biden surely
knows it. The provision is of a piece with crime bills that would make every crime
committed with a firearm a federal crime, because firearms move in interstate com-
merce." Kilpatrick, supra note 158.
162. Editorial, Safe at Home? Not U.S. Women, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 6, 1994, at F6
("Congress is also drawing attention to the problem with the Violence Against
Women Act, already approved by the Senate .... Society in general, and victims in
particular, must understand that domestic violence can no longer be written off as a
private family matter. It is a violent crime like any other.").
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for VAWA on two occasions,'63 as did USA Today. 64 TheSeattle
Intelligencer supported the crime bill in general, including specifically
the VAWA provisions.
65
Some newspapers' editorials specifically supported the civil rights
provision. The New York Times wrote, "[t]he Senate version of the bill
also extends civil rights protection to gender-based hate crimes like rape
(98.9 percent of the victims are women),' 66 and noted that ideally, the
bill that ultimately emerged from Congress would include the civil
rights and the immigrant provisions. 67 The Dallas Morning News sup-
ported the enactment of VAWA generally and specifically supported the
civil rights provision, expressing the hope that the final version would
include both the civil rights remedy and an immigrant provision. 68 The
St. Louis Post-Dispatch also specifically supported the civil rights provi-
sion, linking it to international human rights efforts: "Such a provision
... is a step in a long overdue but now growing international effort to
link crimes against women with violations of human and civil rights."'
169
The Boston Globe supported the civil rights provision stating that it
"would go a long way toward deflating the long-held myths that violent
crimes against women are crimes of passion or sexual attraction gone
))170
awry.
163. The Christian Science Monitor said that "[aifrer years of failing to take the problem
seriously, lawmakers, courts, and police officers are devising ways to help battered
women." The editorial identified VAWA, a bill that "calls for stiffer laws against do-
mestic abuse and permits women to bring civil cases for these attacks," as a "hopeful"
sign. Domestic Violence, Editorial, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 20, 1992, at 20.
Two years later, the Christian Science Monitor wrote another editorial supporting
VAWA. The 1994 editorial said, "it is heartening to have this one clear-cut issue also
seem clear to everybody in Congress." Crime Bill and Women, Editorial, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 29, 1994, at 18.
164. Law Can Help Fight Violence Against Women, Editorial, USA TODAY, June 3, 1993, at
12A ("The Violence Against Women Act aims to take the lead in changing that sorry
record by taking an aggressive stance against gender-based crimes, such as rape, sexual
assault or battery.... [T]he Violence Against Women Act declares an end to open
season on woman. And that's a good start."); Real Crimes, Real Punishment, Editorial,
USA TODAY, Mar. 1, 1994, at 10A ("The proper action now is plain if not simple:
Senate lawmakers ought to strip the Violence Against Women Act out of the worth-
less crime bill and enact the legislation on its own, vastly superior merits.").
165. Congress Moves on Crime Bills, Editorial, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 8,
1993, at A7 (enumerating "commendable elements of the pending legislation").
166. A Million Mrs. Bobbitts, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1994, at A26.
167. Id.
168. Women and Violence, Editorial, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 4, 1994, at 26A.
169. When Women Aren't Safe, Editorial, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 13, 1991, at 2B.
170. Women's Concerns, Senator's Promises, Editorial, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 1991, at
18.
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As with the commentary pieces, editorials reveal different percep-
tions and conceptions of the federal courts. The Washington Post and
the Wall Street Journal viewed the federal courts as busy and overbur-
dened. The Washington Post wrote an editorial supporting Chief Justice
Rehnquist's 1992 remark that Congress was burdening the federal
courts.' 7' The Washington Post said that the federal courts could not per-
form their proper functions "if Congress loads on them new
responsibilities that have traditionally been handled by state courts. 12
The Wall Street Journal said that the provision "may flood the federal
courts with new suits,"'73 and claimed that federal courts were "already
awash in filings from the disability law."' 74
The Washington Post and the Denver Rocky News viewed the type of
activity that the VAWA provision regulated as a distraction for the fed-
eral courts. The Washington Post said that "the whole idea of putting
street crimes, spouse abuse and other traditionally local matters into the
national system is a distortion and a distraction.' ' 75 The Denver Rocky
News said that "good arguments can be made that the federalization of a
host of common crimes distracts federal courts from crimes that are
uniquely their responsibility.'
76
The New Republic viewed the federal court system as too punitive;
it opposed the civil rights provision along with the crime bill as a whole.
The paper cautioned that "Senator Joseph Biden's ill-considered crusade
appears to transform every rape accusation into a potential federal civil
rights offense.'
177
Several other newspapers objected to categorizing violence against
women as class-based discrimination. For example, the Wall Street
Journal said, "[t]he Biden act is mostly about embedding fringe theories
of radical feminism in federal law."'78 According to the Journal, the
provision gave "a patina of congressional approval to the notion that
rape and assault are 'systemic' terrorism perpetuated by men as a class to
171. See Congressional Record, supra note 25, at 583 (reprinting a report on the state of
the federal judiciary by Chief Justice Rehnquist, in which he identified the proposed
VAWA provision as an unnecessary additional burden on the federal judiciary).
172. Federal Courts, Local Cases, Editorial, WASH. PosT, Jan. 5, 1992, at C6.
173. Soft on Crime, Heavy on Fat, Editorial, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1994, at A10.
174. Id.
175. Federal Courts, Local Cases, Editorial, supra note 172.
176. With Domestic Violence, Answers Must be Close to Home, Editorial, DENVER ROCKY
MNT. NEWS, June 26, 1994, at 93A.
177. Crime Dog, NEW REPUBLIC, Sep. 19, 1994, at 7.
178. Soft on Crime, Heavy on Fat, supra note 173.
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subjugate women as a class."' 79 "Such sentiments," the Journal
contended, "abound in college classrooms, but they shouldn't be
extended to the criminal law."'' 80 The News & Record (Greensboro, NC)
also objected to the class-based approach of the remedy, writing that
"Sen. Joe Biden's bill [was] at its core a wrong-headed effort to turn
sexual assault and rape into federal crimes and to transform them from
individual acts of violence into symptoms of social pathology."'8 '
Other papers, like the New Republic and the Washington Times,
viewed the remedy as thought-policing. The Washington Times attacked
the civil rights remedy as "[f]eminist thought-policing."' 82 The New Re-
public said that the remedy created thought crimes. It wrote, "[t]he only
hope for civil libertarians is that the act, which creates an entirely new
category of thought crimes, appears to be unconstitutional under Wis-
consin v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court's recent hate crimes decision."'83
These papers viewed the remedy as regulating thoughts because of the
animus requirement, which demanded an inquiry into the motive of the
attacker.
The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette argued that the provision would en-
courage women to avoid the criminal system. "Far from changing [the
criminal justice] system," it cautioned, "this bill might encourage even
more women to circumvent the criminal courts and take their chances
in federal court, where the standard of proof is lower and the chance for
monetary awards exists.""" The Post-Gazette concluded, "[ilt is in no
one's interest for that to happen and in everyone's interest to focus more
attention and effort at improving the way the criminal-justice system
,,185
treats rape cases.
B. Debate During the Litigation
This section looks at the debate in the press commencing at the be-
ginning of the Morrison litigation. Commentators and editors made
some of the same arguments as before the litigation, but new points of
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Don't Make A Federal Case of the Bizarre Bobbitts, Editorial, NEWS & RECORD
(Greensboro, N.C.), Jan. 25, 1994, at A8.
182. Arrest That Crime Bill, Editorial, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1994, at A16.
183. Crime Dog, supra note 177, at 7 (identifying First Amendment problems, but failing
to mention that the provision could be unconstitutional on federalism grounds).
184. Raped by the System, Editorial, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 21, 1993, at C2,
LEXIS, News & Business, News, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.
185. Id.
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disagreement also emerged. There were four main areas of disagreement:
1) whether the provision promoted the rights of women or undermined
the rights of others; 2) whether the remedy was a civil rights law or a
criminal or family law; 3) whether the provision was a needed and valid
use of the federal power or whether it unconstitutionally infringed on
states' rights; and 4) whether gender-motivated violence was sufficiently




Throughout the litigation of Morrison, individuals writing com-
mentary about the civil rights remedy continued to argue about the
rights at stake in VAWA. Some emphasized that the rights of women
were at stake; others stressed the rights of men, minorities or the ac-
cused.
NOWLDEF represented Christy Brzonkala, the plaintiff in Morri-
son, and defended the constitutionality of the remedy. Individuals from
the group wrote a number of opinion pieces and letters to the editor
emphasizing that the rights of women were at stake in the litigation.
Kathy Rogers, the executive director of NOWLDEF, explained in a let-
ter to the editor that the civil rights remedy regulated discrimination
against women. She wrote, "[t]his kind of hatred results in discrimina-
tion based on gender, just as racial hatred results in racial
discrimination." '86 Andrew G. Celli and Jennifer K. Brown, from the
New York State Attorney General's office, wrote a piece supporting the
remedy. They said, "[t] he Violence Against Women Act's civil remedy is
civil rights legislation of the classic sort: motivated, at its core, by docu-
mented bias and discrimination.
1 87
Meanwhile, columnists who voiced concerns about VAWA before
the remedy was enacted continued to raise these concerns. Columnist
Cathy Young again argued against the categorization of some forms of
186. Kathy Rogers, Letter to the Editor, Legislating Against Hate, WASH. POST, Nov. 28,
1997, at A26.
187. Andrew G. Celli, Jr. & Jennifer K. Brown, VAWA is Valid and Needed, NAT. L. J.,
Jan. 17, 2000, at A18. Celli was chief of the Civil Rights Bureau, and Brown was di-
rector of the Reproductive Rights Unit at the Office of the New York State Attorney
General.
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violence against women as based on gender bias. She said that rape is
not "gender-motivated" and does not constitute discrimination against
women: "VAWA talks about 'gender-motivated violence'-meaning
that victims of rape or wife abuse are supposedly attacked 'because of
their sex,' much as victims of anti-black or anti-Asian violence are at-
tacked because of racial prejudice."'0 8 She argued, "[w]ithout a detailed
dissection of this logic, suffice it to say that it can't explain why some
men (and especially boys) are sexually assaulted too, or why there is bat-
tering in gay and lesbian couples, or why some women abuse their
husbands." '89 Jeremy Rabkin, a professor of government at Cornell Uni-
versity, wrote a number of columns against the civil rights remedy.
Rabkin complained that it was hard to figure out which acts of violence
are gender-motivated. He asked, "Did the husband beat his wife because
she was female or because she was his wife?"' 90
Columnists also argued that VAWA discriminated against men
instead of combating discrimination against women. Cathy Young told
readers "that in three-quarters of homicides in America, and nearly two-
thirds of all violent crimes, the victims are men."' 9' Columnist Robyn
Blumner argued, "the law's faulty premise is its greatest failing. Equality
under the law-the clarion call of the early women's movement-means
you apply the law uniformly irrespective of gender. There should be no
presumptions that men's violent acts are more culpable than
188. Cathy Young, Doing Violence to Equal Protection, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 8, 1995, at
7E.
189. Id. Young said in a later piece, "[w]hen a man's sexual urges are directed toward
women, his sexual aggression will be too." She noted, "[tihe interpretation of rape as
inherently gender-motivated cannot explain sexual assaults on boys or sexual coercion
among gays and lesbians." Cathy Young, Rape Suits Fuel Showdown Over State Rights,
Violence and Gender Issues, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 20, 2000, at N2 1.
190. Jeremy Rabkin, Christy on the Brink, Let's Hear it for a Landmark Ruling that Restrains
the Feds, AM. SPECTATOR, Jan. 1997, at 60-61 [hereinafter Rabkin, Christy on the
Brink]. Rabkin said in another article, "[t]he statute is a monument to feminist ideol-
ogy. It does not cover the stalker who loves women too much or the mugger who
loves women's handbags too much, but only those who act from class-based hatred of
women (or men)-as a federal court may come to understand this bizarre criminal
sub-specialty." Jeremy Rabkin, Bill's Fickle Feminists: How Quickly They've Forgotten
What They're AllAbout, AM. SPECTATOR, May 1998, at 60-61 [hereinafter Rabkin,
Bill's Fickle Feminists].
191. Young, supra note 189, at N21. Young said in an earlier piece, "[m]en are victims of
violent crime at almost twice the rate of women and are killed more than three times
as often." Young concluded, "Congress should at least make sure that [VAWA] is en-
forced in a way that provides equal protection to both sexes-and that the money
goes to help victims, not to fight 'patriarchy.'" Young, supra note 188.
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women's." 92 Rabkin questioned "who really suffers more from official
'gender bias' in this area, '  and characterized "the notion that family
life is a special danger to women" as "a twisted feminist fantasy."'94
According to Rabkin, "[i]n absolute numbers, moreover, far more men
than women are killed each year by family members or 'romantic
partners.' "19 "If anyone needs protection from 'violence,'" he stated, "it
is men.... If we are going to obsess about 'gender bias,' the most
evident bias in the jury system is anti-male.""' 16 Editorial writer Robert
Keith Smith held out a similar view. He wrote that VAWA "legislatessexual ' ,. 197 ,
sexual inequality." He argued that "[m]en who feel their safety is as
important as that of a woman's safety should protest such a sexist law"
and that "[p]arents of sons should demand equal protection for
them.""8 Curt A. Levey, director of legal affairs at the Center for
Individual Rights, and attorney for defendant Tony Morrison, wrote
that the VAWA provision had nothing to do with promoting civil rights
but in fact undermined the civil rights of defendants. Levey said, "[b]y
singling out women as victims and men as predators, the statute ratifies
the radical feminist view of men as the oppressor class. The rights of
accused men suffer as a result."' 99
Before the enactment of the civil rights remedy, commentators
raised the issue of race in several ways. Supporters of the Act argued that
192. Robyn Blumner, Wrong to Let "Victim Feminists" Stack Deck Against Men, Hous.
CHRON., Dec. 12, 1999, at 4C. Blumner also said, "[s]o when recent studies indi-
cated that the arrest rate of women for domestic violence was creeping up, victim
feminists scrambled to figure out how to blame men for the violence that women
do .... With women entering the military, the world of professional boxing (even
against male opponents) and other contact sports, the fact that women can be physi-
cally aggressive should not surprise anyone.... No one questions statistics on
mothers arrested for child abuse. Why is it hard to believe that women abuse their
spouses?" Id. Blumner is a columnist and editorial writer for the St. Petersburg Times.
193. Jeremy Rabkin, More Equal Than Others: Has 'Equal Justice' Been Sacrificed to the




197. Robert Keith Smith, Editorial, Violence Against Men is Also Crime, CHARLESTON GA-
ZETTE, Apr. 28, 1995, at 4A.
198. Id.; see also Frank S. Zepezauer, Does the Violence Against Women Act Discriminate
Against Men? Yes: Laws on Spousal Abuse Are Unfair to Men and Give Sanction to
Feminist Ideas, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, May 27, 1996, at 24.
199. Curt A. Levey, Feminist Ignore "Brzonkala" Facts, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 7, 2000, at A20.
Levey continued, "Ms. Brzonkala reigns as the act's poster girl, while the news media
and the law's supporters brand Mr. Morrison a rapist. You'd never know that he has
twice been cleared of the rape charges." Id.
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women should have the same civil rights protections as minorities. 00
The ACLU argued that the remedy would harm the rights of minorities
by overloading the federal courts.2"' During the Morrison litigation,
however, race came up in a new way because the defendants were black
and the plaintiff was white. Morrison's attorney, Curt Levey, asserted,
"Ms. Brzonkala and her supporters trumpet the law as essential protec-
tion for the civil rights of women. But what about Mr. Morrison's
rights? ... It used to be that when a black man in the South faced un-
substantiated charges of raping a white woman, civil rights crusaders
flocked to the black man's defense. Now they flock to Christy Brzon-
kala."2' 2 Professor Jeremy Rabkin argued that it was the defendants' civil
rights at stake, not Christy Brzonkala's:
If the case looks like the latest feminist fashion, it might ap-
pear on another level, however, as a tale out of the Old South.
Brzonkala did not file charges (of any kind) until six months
after the alleged event. She claimed not to know who the per-
petrators were until she recognized their pictures in a football
program given to her the following spring. At the administra-
tive hearing before school authorities, Brzonkala was unable to
recall much of anything about her assailants except that they
were black. To spare her sensibilities, Brzonkala was allowed to
testify by telephone, so as to avoid having to face the two men
she was accusing of rape. Isn't this the point where Gregory
Peck arrives on the scene to defend the black men? ... When
the case was finally put to a grand jury, it refused to issue any
200. See supra note 135.
201. See supra note 151.
202. Levey, supra note 199. Levey said in a later piece, "after investigating her allegations,
a Roanoke, Va., grand jury cleared both Morrison and Crawford, despite the region's
historically harsh treatment of black men accused of raping white women." Curt A.
Levey, High Court Should Reaffirm Limits on Congressional Power, LEGAL TIMES, Mar.
29, 1999, at 17. Lynn Hecht Schafran of NOW responded to a Center for Individual
Rights press release mentioning the defendants' race: "If CIR is so adverse to race-
baiting, why does its Sept. 28, 1999, press release on the Supreme Court's accepting
the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) case U.S. v. Morrison include the fact that
the female plaintiff is white and the two men accused of raping her are black?"
Schafran continued, "it is ironic that an organization devoted to dismantling the civil
rights laws should be raising the specter of the Scottsboro boys." Lynn Hecht
Schafran, CIR Not So High-Minded on Race, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 7, 2000, at A19.
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indictments against the students. The South is a bit different,
after all, than it was in Gregory Pecks day.203
While these few individuals raised the issue of race, most writing
about the Morrison case did not mention the race of the parties. No
newspaper editorials mentioned the race of the parties, and only the
New York Times, the Roanoke Times & World News, and the Virginian-
Pilot reported this fact in articles about the case. 204 These papers men-
tioned the race of the parties when the case was first brought but did not
mention it after 1996. The Richmond Times Dispatch, a paper that cov-
ered Brzonkala's case from the start, never mentioned the race of the
men or Brzonkala.0 5
b. Federal/State Jurisdiction
In United States v. Lopez, 20 6 the Supreme Court held that Congress
had exceeded its powers in enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act.
The Court found that the statute regulated crime, and said that in the
area of "criminal law enforcement" states "historically have been sover-
eign." The Court also described "family law" as within the scope of
historic state regulation. 207 Thus, whether "gender-motivated" violence
was categorized as a "domestic relations" law, a "criminal" law or a "dis-
crimination" law mattered greatly under the Court's new federalism
reasoning.2 8 Proponents of the remedy categorized VAWA as a civil
rights law and argued that the federal role was appropriate in combating
discrimination and protecting civil rights. They emphasized that civil
rights was an area of traditional federal concern and that Congress had
203. Rabkin, Christy on the Brink, supra note 190, at 60. Rahkin said in another piece,
"[iln an earlier era, a white girl crying 'rape' might have harped on the fact that her
,assailants' were black." Jeremy Rabkin, Federalism v. Feminism: The Supreme Court is
Likely to Side with the Federalists, AM. SPECTATOR, Dec. 1999/Jan. 2000, at 60 [here-
inafter Rahkin, Federalism vs. Feminism]. Rabkin said in a piece about the first Fourth
Circuit opinion (which upheld the constitutionality of the provision): "The opinion
mentions no fewer than six times that the defendants in the Brzonkala case were
football players. The opinion rightly does not mention their race (they happen to be
black, while Brzonkala is white)." Rabkin, Bill's Fickle Feminists, supra note 190, at
61.
204. See supra note 123.
205. See supra note 123.
206. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
207. Id. at 564.
208. Resnik, supra note 13.
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the authority to step in where the states had failed. Opponents of the
remedy categorized it as regulating crime, domestic relations, or tort law
and argued that these were matters for the states, not the federal gov-
ernment, to regulate. They maintained that federal intervention was
both inappropriate and unconstitutional. Before Lopez, those opposed
to VAWA argued that federal regulation of gender-motivated violence
was inappropriate. 209 After Lopez, they argued that the federal role was
not just inappropriate on policy grounds, but actually unconstitutional.
In contrast, supporters of the legislation continued to characterize
the remedy as a civil rights law. Andrew G. Celli and Jennifer K. Brown
of the New York Attorney General's office stated that, "[tihe Violence
Against Women Act's civil remedy is civil rights legislation of the classic
sort: motivated, at its core, by documented bias and discrimination.,
210
They emphasized that the provision complemented, not comman-
deered, state power: "[t]he Violence Against Women Act is that rare
case in which, instead of competing for credit or blaming one another,
the states and the federal government have joined hands to identify, un-
derstand and begin to address a truly national problem. '2 1
Kathy Rogers of NOWLDEF also categorized VAWA as regulating
discrimination. She wrote, "[t]his kind of hatred results in discrimina-
tion based on gender, just as racial hatred results in racial
discrimination," and the "federal government has a strong, indeed com-
pelling, interest in preventing this debilitating discrimination. 21 2 She
said in a later letter, "[flar from stepping into an area of state concern,
VAWA invokes a strong, traditional federal interest-the civil rights of
all its citizens."2"3 Julie Goldscheild, a NOWLDEF lawyer, wrote in a
letter to the editor that "Congress has full authority to enhance the
VAWA civil rights remedy to combat gender-based violent crime that
violates women's civil rights, just as it passed Reconstruction-era civil
rights laws and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in a federal rejection of dis-
crimination and civil rights violations. 21 4
Opponents, however, continued to say that the federal role was
improper. Edward McDonough, a lawyer from Salt Lake City, wrote in
209. See supra text accompanying notes 157-62.
210. Andrew G. Celli Jr. & Jennifer K. Brown, VAWA is Valid and Needed, NAT'L L. J.,
Jan. 17, 2000, at A18.
211. Id.
212. Kathy Rodgers, Editorial, Legislating Against Hate, WASH. Posr, Nov. 28, 1997, at
A26.
213. Kathy Rodgers, Editorial, Ending Violence Against Women, WASH. POST, Apr. 5,
1999, at A16.
214. Julie Goldscheid, Letters, Congress Was Within Its Rights to Protect Civil Rights, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1996, at A20.
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the Salt Lake City Tribune that "[u] ntil relatively recently in this coun-
try's history, it would have been unthinkable for Congress to enact
legislation dealing with common tort law, damage suits for injuries due
to another's negligence or deliberate action."2 5 He continued, "[s]uch
matters, as well as common-law crimes such as burglary and rape, were
considered strictly state matters and presumed so by constitutional in-
terpretation., 26 Harvie Wilkinson, III, the Chief Judge of the Fourth
Circuit who joined the majority's opinion declaring the civil rights rem-
edy unconstitutional, said in an opinion piece, "[t] he court will also take
up the hotly debated question of whether Congress has the power to
invade the province of domestic relations law through the Violence
Against Women Act., 217 Columnist Joseph Sobran warned that "[e]very
dispute between spouses can now escalate into a 'civil rights' case," and
"millions of divorce cases, traditionally local matters, may soon clog the
federal courts. ',2 ' Anita Blair, President of the Independent Women's
Forum, also categorized the VAWA remedy as a tort remedy. She ar-
gued that "the bottom-line difference between a federal 'gender' case
and a traditional state tort action is how much the lawyers may get in
fees." According to Blair, "The Violence Against Women Act is only
just one of many federal laws that benefit trial lawyers by making federal
civil rights claims out of actions previously addressed as state tort
claim s.
219
c. Regulating Commerce or Crime?
Those writing in support of the constitutionality of the remedy
emphasized the connection they saw between gender-motivated violence
and commerce. They argued that the link between discrimination and
interstate commerce was clear. Maureen M. Murphy, an attorney for the
Connecticut Women's Education and Legal Fund, said that "Congress'
extensive fact-finding concerning violence against women . .. provided
compelling evidence of the substantial effect of this social problem on
215. Edward McDonough, Editorial, When Congress Offinds Constitution, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Aug. 4, 1996, at AA3.
216. Id.
217. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Editorial, Fear of Federalism, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1999, at
A45.
218. Joseph Sobran, A Dubious Reading of Commerce Clause, LAs VEGAS REv.-J., July 20,
1997, at 2D.
219. Anita K. Blair, Viewpoint: Trial Lawyers and Women s Rights, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY,
Feb. 4, 2000, http://www.iwf.org/news/000204.shtm.
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interstate commerce."'' 0 In a letter to the editor, NOWLDEF's Julie
Goldscheild asserted that the "legislative record documented what
women's rights advocates have known all along: that gender-based
crimes such as domestic violence, rape and sexual assault violate
women's civil rights and have a direct impact on interstate commerce,
just like other civil rights laws."
221
Conversely, other commentators emphasized the lack of connec-
tion they saw between "rape" and "commerce." Columnist James
Kilpatrick said that "Congress has the power to regulate commerce. It
has no power to regulate rape." '222 Columnist John Leo remarked,
"[n]obody can say with a straight face that 'gender based' violence in-
volves interstate commerce. 2 2 3 Wendy Kaminer, in a piece for American
Prospect, urged her readers to "[try the common sense test: When you
think of a rare in a college dormitory, do you think about interstate
commerce?" Professor Jeremy Rabkin asserted, "[w]hatever else it is, 'a
crime of violence motivated by gender' (in VAWA's weird phrasing)
isn't 'commerce,' let alone interstate commerce. 2 2' 5 Dave Kopel, a policy
220. Maureen M. Murphy, Help and Hopefor Preventing Violence Against Women, CONN.
L. TRiB., May 20, 1996, at 24.
221. Julie Goldscheild, Editorial, Congress Was Within Its Rights to Protect Civil Rights,
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1996, at A20. Andrew G. Celli Jr. and Jennifer K. Brown
said that the remedy was "motivated, at its core, by documented bias and discrimina-
tion; justified, in whole, by the impact such discrimination has on interstate
commerce and the national economy." Andrew G. Celli Jr. & Jennifer K Brown,
VAWA is Valid and Needed, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 17, 2000, at A18.
222. James J. Kilpatrick, Christy and the Constitution, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 7, 1999.
223. John Leo, Outlook, By Dubious Means, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 24, 2000, at
12.
224. Wendy Kaminer, Comment, Sexual Congress, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 14, 2000, at 8.
Judith Resnik, a Professor at Yale Law School, responding to Kaminer's piece, ex-
plained the connection between gender-motivated violence and commerce:
Since the 1960s, the Constitution has been understood as permitting Con-
gress to remove obstacles to engaging in commerce-especially
discriminatory obstacles. Before enacting VAWA, Congress heard testi-
mony from both business executives and individuals detailing not only that
violence has an economic effect on the GDP, but that violence against
women limits women's full participation as economic actors. Congress
learned both that women were beaten to prevent them from going to work
and that the threat of violence restricted women's employment options.
Judith Resnik, Citizenship and Violence, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 27, 2000, at 62.
225. Rabkin, Federalism v. Feminism, supra note 203, at 61. Rabkin argued in an earlier
piece that "[o]n technical grounds, the argument for [Judge Kiser's] holding is rea-
sonably strong. After all, the effect of muttered remarks-even the very coarse and
crude ones-on interstate commerce is, to say the least, rather indirect and remote."
Rabkin, Christy on the Brink, supra note 190, at 61.
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analyst, and Glenn Reynolds, a law professor, 26 argued that it "is quite a
stretch ... to claim that the power to regulate the buying and selling of
products across state lines includes the power to regulate drunken sex
acts of college students. 227 According to these commentators, "[u]nder
the Constitution, all the other topics (like disputes between college stu-
dents) are to be handled by the states, not the Federal government.""'
Kopel and Reynolds attempted to undermine Brzonkala's case by
implying that the conduct at issue was not even a crime. According to
their view of the facts, the regulated behavior was not a crime, but just a
drunken interpersonal dispute, so it certainly was not something in
which the federal government had to be involved. Professor Jeremy
Rabkin took a similar approach and described the facts of Brzonkala's
case to undermine the VAWA provision: "The undisputed facts are that
Christy Brzonkala, a student at Virginia Tech, on her way home from
another party, took herself up to the dorm room of two male stu-
dents., 229 According to Rabkin's view of the facts "she did not know
these students and it was already two a.m. Brzonkala arrived with a fe-
male friend but she stayed behind when her friend left and also stayed
behind when one of the male students did. Then there was sex., 230 The
truth of Brzonkala's allegations was not at issue before the Supreme
Court; the Court took her allegations as true and determined whether
the remedy itself was constitutional. Rabkin, like Kopel and Reynolds,
appears to give his own account of the facts in order to undermine
Brzonkala's case-even though what actually happened in the dorm
room was not relevant to the issue before the Court.
226. Dave Kopel is an associate policy analyst, Cato Institute, Washington, D.C. Glenn
Reynolds is Professor of Law, University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
227. Dave Kopel & Glenn Reynolds, Crime, Congress and the Interstate Commerce Clause,
USA ToDAY, May 1, 2000, Magazine, at 60. "Moreover, even though all crime has
some economic effects, the impact of crimes like drunken sex on interstate commerce
is insignificant, they continued." Id.
228. Id. Kopel and Reynolds gave the following account of the facts of the case: "[WIhen
college student Christy Brzonkala got very drunk one night and, by her account, was
date-raped by two other students, she got to sue in Federal, rather than state, court."
Id.
229. Rabkin, Federalism v. Feminism, supra note 203, at 600.
230. Id. For another description of the facts by Rabkin, see Rabkin, Christy on the Brink,
supra note 190, at 60-61.
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2. Editorials
While most newspapers waited until after the Court's decision to
print editorials about the Morrison case, some expressed opinions earlier.
The Richmond Times Dispatch and the News & Record wrote editorials
after the district court's decision to strike down the VAWA remedy as
exceeding Congress's Commerce Clause power."' The Richmond Times
Dispatch agreed with the court's reasoning. "[I]f the standard for con-
gressional action is this broad, then there is literally nothing in the
world Congress cannot do: Theoretically, anything might affect inter-
state commerce, it wrote." 232 The paper also complained that "[tihe
Violence Against Women Act also relies on far-out sociology. Feminist
writer Andrea Dworkin, who consulted with Joe Biden on the bill when
he was sponsoring it in the Senate, contends that all sex is rape (and
therefore, all men are rapists); men, she says, 'eroticize inequality.' "2
According to the Richmond Times Dispatch, "[t]he thinking behind the
Violence Against Women Act is that rape is not merely an act of indi-
vidual wickedness but a part of a society-wide attempt to oppress
women."234 The News & Record of Greensboro, North Carolina also
supported the district court's opinion. The paper opined that the "three
defendants were little more than handy stage props-except for the in-
convenience of having to defend themselves and their reputations. 2 5
The News & Record gave the following view of the facts of the case:
Brzonkala, a student at Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, accused
three Tech football players of raping her in their dormitory
room late at night. But the evidence strongly pointed toward a
consensual sexual encounter. Brzonkala never mentioned the
incident for five months, and did not make a formal com-
plaint until two months after that. Subsequent student
disciplinary hearings found the charge of rape unsupported by
fact. And a county grand jury declined to indict."3
231. Bronzkala v. Va. Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996).
232. Women s Rights, Editorial, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Aug. 1, 1996, at Al0.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. State Law Is Capable of Protecting Women, Editorial, NEWS & REc. (Greensboro,
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The News & Record, therefore, concluded that Congress had "cre-
ated an ideological monster, an open invitation to mischief.
2
11
Georgia's Augusta Chronicle also wrote in support of the district court's
decision to hold the VAWA remedy provision unconstitutional. It ar-
gued that "[1law-enforcement should be left to local and state police
agencies.... Giving the federal government supremacy weakens local
control and creates confusing overlapping jurisdictions.
2
1
The New York Times, the Washington Post, the Herald Sun (Dur-
ham, N.C.), the Richmond Times Dispatch, the Atlanta Journal and
Constitution, and the Las Vegas Review-Journal all wrote editorials after
the Supreme Court decided to hear the case. The New York Times was
the only one of these papers to write in support of the provision. It
wrote an editorial when the Court started its session in the fall of 1999.
The Times said that the VAWA decision, along with two other deci-
sions-an age discrimination case and a Driver's Privacy Protection Act
case-would "tell whether the Court's narrow but aggressive states'
rights majority intends to weaken Congress's power to protect basic civil
rights."'23 When the Supreme Court took the case, the Washington Post
said that the "question at issue is whether Congress can give rape victims
the right to sue their alleged attackers in federal courts even if the at-
tacks have no obvious interstate or commercial dimension."'24 The paper
conceded that it "is not an easy call. If the law is valid, it is hard to
imagine anything Congress cannot do under the guise of regulating
commerce. On the other hand, striking down such a law could have
implications for valuable government initiatives.,, 21' The Herald-Sun of
Durham, North Carolina, stated, "[t]his case will be a tough call for the
high court, which must weigh the legitimate concerns about the civil
rights of women, the rights of crime victims, and the constitutional
237. Id.
238. Wrong Crime Medicine, Editorial, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Georgia), Mar. 11, 1999, atA4.
239. The High Court Returns, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1999, at A26. The Times later
wrote:
Americans concerned about preserving civil rights and Congress's legiti-
mate role in providing national remedies to national problems had best
brace themselves. Yesterday the justices also heard arguments in another
important federalism case, this one testing the constitutionality of the Vio-
lence Against Women Act. The employment decision could well be a
harbinger of other damaging federalism rulings to come.
Another Loss on States'Rights, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2000, at A22.
240. The Supreme Court's Docket, Editorial, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1999, at A22.
241. Id.
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question of Congress' authority. ' '24' But it concluded, "[tihe court ought
to rule on the side of limiting further federal encroachment into state
and local matters. 2' The Richmond Times Dispatch wrote, "njot every
evil in the world is a job for Congress., 244 It also advanced "rights" ar-
guments that echo other commentary about the Act: "In focusing on
crimes against women, Congress seems to treat those crimes as of greater
moment than violent crime against men., 245 The Atlanta Journal and
Constitution, a publication that earlier supported the enactment of
VAWA, changed its mind. The paper wrote, in January 2000, "[w]e
predict this law's application to the states will not survive the court's
scrutiny, imposing one more sensible limit on the breadth and the reach
of federal power." '246 The paper said that "t] he Rehnquist Court is mak-
ing a lasting and important contribution to the constitutional goal of
keeping power away from Washington, and closest to the people.)
247
Finally, the Las Vegas Review-Journal, in April 2000, called the VAWA
provision "a well-intentioned effort that twisted the Constitution's
commerce clause to justify federal intervention in domestic violence. 248
C. Viewpoints After the Courts Decision
1. Commentary
a. Discrimination Claims
After the Court's decision, commentators raised the same discrimi-
nation claims they had raised before: that the provision discriminated
against men and violated the rights of defendants. Columnist John Leo,
who had argued from the start against categorizing violence as "gender-
based," made this point again after the Court's decision. He said that
even if the facts presented to Congress about the incidence of rape and
domestic violence were true, "[t]hey still would fail to establish how
242. Violence Against Women Law, High Court's Tough Call, Editorial, HERALD-SUN (Dur-
ham, N.C.), Sept. 30, 1999, at A12.
243. Id.
244. Against Wisdom, Editorial, RICH. TIMEs-DISPATCH, Sept. 30, 1999, at Al4.
245. Id.
246. High Court Wisely Limits Feds' Powers, Editorial, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Jan. 25,
2000, at A8.
247. Id.
248. "Pushing the Edge, "Editorial, LAs VF(;AS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Apr. 23, 2000, at 2J.
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/" ,,249much male-on-female violence is motivated by gender bias. Leo as-
serted that "[o]verwhelming evidence, in study after study, shows that
men are victimized by domestic violence at least as often as, if not more
than, women. 25 ° Columnist Stephen Chapman made the same point:
"[Violence] does discriminate on the basis of gender: not against females
but against males .... Violence against women is not an outgrowth of
sexism but just one aspect of our high crime rate.,,21
Stuart Taylor, a writer at the National Journal, expressed concern
about the rights of defendants: "The Framers confined Congress to cer-
tain enumerated powers, including the power to regulate interstate
commerce, mainly to protect not states but individuals from a distant,
overbearing national government. A corollary goal was to protect those
accused of crimes from being pursued by both state and federal court
,,252
systems.
Leo, Chapman, and Taylor all viewed the VAWA provision as in-
fringing on rights, rather than promoting rights. Leo and Chapman
were concerned about the rights of male victims of violence; Taylor was
concerned about the rights of defendants. Political analyst Phyllis
Schlafly also focused on the rights of the defendants in Morrison. She
was the only commentator to bring up the issue of the defendants' race
after the Court's decision. She said that VAWA was passed under the
"deceptive name of civil rights" when "[i]n fact, the VAWA provision
did nothing to advance civil rights.""' According to Schlafly, the "media
and VAWA supporters persistently concealed the fact that the defen-
dants in US v. Morrison were blacks who had been exonerated by the
criminal justice system, yet were later subjected to civil allegations un-
justified by any independent investigation.,
254
249. John Leo, Outlook, Was it Law or Poery?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., May 29,
2000, at 10.
250. Id.
251. Stephen Chapman, Violence Against US. Women Declining, Editorial, POST & COU-
RIER (Charleston, SC), May 23, 2000, at A13. Chapman is a columnist for the
Chicago Tribune and Creators Syndicate, Inc.
252. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Why You Can't Sue Your Rapist in Federal Court, 32 NAT'L J. 1577,
1578 (2000).
253. Id.
254. Phyllis Schlafly, Supreme Court Upholds Constitution in VAWA Decision, COPLEY
NEWS SERV., May 22, 2000, LEXIS, News & Business, News, Copley News Service.
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b. Federal/State Jurisdiction
As discussed above, most newspapers did not report that the Court
had overturned a "civil rights law." Many commentators, however, de-
fined the decision as a major loss for civil rights and emphasized that the
provision had been an appropriate use of federal power. Professor Bar-
bara Ransby said: "[I]n other words, states' rights trump civil rights yet
again." '  Cathy Rogers of NOWLDEF said that the decision was "a
major triumph for a powerful movement aime[d] to strip the federal
government of its authority to protect civil rights of Americans .... This
'New Federalism' is a euphemism for states rights, long the symbol and
reality of second-class citizenship for women and minorities." '256 After
the Court's decision, radio host Laura Flanders said that "we're starting
the 21" Century with our civil rights set back to before the New
Deal., 257 The Attorney General of Washington State, Christine Gre-
goire, and Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) said, "[t]his week, our nation
took a huge step backward in our slow march to guarantee civil rights
for all Americans.,
258
Several commentators emphasized that the civil rights remedy did
not displace state law, but complemented it. "The VAWA provision
expands civil rights, not federal meddling in state affairs," Gregoire and
Murray said.25' Law Professor Peter M. Shane took a similar stance
when he pointed out that Brzonkala's "right [to bring suit] posed no
tension between state and federal authorities,"260 and that "[fIrom the
states' point of view, this [federalism] campaign is often pointless and
sometimes counterproductive. '  It was Shane's opinion that most
states were not hostile to the federal VAWA.
262
255. Barbara Ransby, Commentary, Supreme Court Sends Dangerous Message to Women,
KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIBUNE, May 25, 2000, LEXIS, News & Business, News, Knight
Ridder/Tribune. Ransby is Assistant Professor of African-American Studies and His-
tory at the University of Illinois at Chicago.
256. Kathy Rogers, Do Rape Cases Belong in Federal Courts? Yes: State Remedies Fall Short,
RI c. (Bergen County, NJ), May 25, 2000, at L9.
257. Laura Flanders, The New Federalist Revolution, IN THFSF TIMES, June 26, 2000, at 8.
258. Christine Gregoire & Patty Murray, Justice Not Servedfor Victims of Violence, SEAT-
TLE TIMES, May 18, 2000, at B7.
259. Id.
260. Peter M. Shane, In Whose Best Interest? Not the States', WASH. POST, May 21, 2000, at
B5. Shane is a law professor at the University of Pittsburgh.
261. Id.
262. This view is confirmed by the fact that thirty-nine state attorneys general supported
the enactment of VAWA. See Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong. 34 (1993) (letter from Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York
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Other commentators, however, argued that VAWA was an imper-
missible federal "intervention" into "traditionally" state affairs.
Commentators who categorized the civil rights provision as regulating
crime, tort law, or domestic relations said that these matters were mat-
ters of state concern and should not be federalized. "[A]t issue [in
Morrison] was whether the federal government can regulate aspects of
marriage and domestic relations, which have always been within the ex-
clusive domain of the states. ' Law Professor Bradley Gitz wrote that
"the court acted to preserve the authority of state and local governments
in the crucial area of law enforcement., 264 The Los Angeles Times printed
a letter saying that "matters such as rape are topics par excellence for
state and local law., 265 Andrea Neal, an editorial writer for the Indian-
apolis Star, said that "Congress should know better than to federalize
state crimes. ' 266 Lee Anderson, associate editor and publisher of the
Chattanooga Free Press, commented: "Not everything should be made
into 'a federal case.' ,267
c. Regulating Commerce or Crime?
Like they had before the Court's ruling, a number of commentators
remarked after the Court's decision in May 2000 that they saw no
connection between gender-motivated violence and the Commerce
Clause. Many who supported the Court's decision appealed to the
on Behalf of His Colleagues to Congressman Jack Brooks, Chair of the House Judici-
ary Committee (July 22, 1993)). The thirty-nine state attorneys general were joined
by the attorneys general of the District of Columbia and Guam. Id. Thirty-six state
attorneys general defended the constitutionality of the remedy before the Supreme
Court. See Brief of the States of Arizona et al. in Support of Petitioners' Brief on the
Merits, U.S. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29), 1999 WL 1032809
(arguing VAWA's constitutionality on Commerce Clause grounds). Only one state,
Alabama, filed in support of VAWA's invalidation. See Brief for the State of Alabama
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(Nos. 99-5, 99-29), 1999 WL 1191432; see also Resnik, supra note 13, at 627-28.
263. Schlafy, supra note 254. "[T]his VAWA provision would have been a giant step to-
ward a complete takeover of marriage and domestic relations law by the federal
government." Id.
264. Bradley R. Gitz, ConstitutionalAbuse, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, June 2, 2000. Gitz
is Professor of Politics at Lyon College at Batesville.
265. T.A. Heppenheimer, Rape Ruling, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2000, at B6.
266. Andrea Neal, Enough of Congress Meddling, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 25, 2000, at
A16.
267. Lee Anderson, Rape: Terrible Crime, Correct Ruling, CHATrANOOGA FREE PRESS, May
17, 2000, at B7.
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"commonsense" view that "rape" is not interstate commerce and
therefore cannot be regulated pursuant to the Commerce Clause. They
described the Court's decision as an obvious rejection of an
unreasonable argument made by Congress. Most of these commentators
failed to mention, however, that before Lopez the Court had not struck
down a law enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause since the New
Deal.268
Michael Kelly from the National Journal wrote that the Court re-
jected Congress's "almost comically expansionist view of federal
powers."26' Todd Gaziano, a senior fellow in legal studies at the Heritage
Foundation, called Congress's Commerce Clause reasoning a "chaos
theory.""27 Columnist James Kilpatrick said, "I thought that [Wickara]
was wrongly decided, but at least wheat has some connection to inter-
state commerce. Rape has none."27' Columnist John Leo wrote that the
Court had reached a "reasonable, even obvious, conclusion., 272 Leo said,
"'[G]ender-motivated' violence is not an economic activity. Pretending
that it has something to do with commerce between states is legal po-
etry, not common sense or good law. ' Anne M. Hayes, an attorney
for the Pacific Legal Foundation, which urged the Court to strike down
the VAWA provision, remarked that "[t]he five-justice majority and
even (or perhaps especially) those who have no legal training are hard-
pressed to identify a link between rape and interstate commerce." '274 Ac-
cording to Professor Bradley R. Gitz, Justice Souter "penned ...
perhaps the most embarrassing opinion in recent court history, making
the bizarre argument that, since violence against women has at least
some indirect economic consequences, the commerce clause of the Con-
stitution gives Congress the right to regulate it."27' Gitz said that
commerce "has no more to do with the crime of rape than it has to do
with the status of children's dental habits or suburban lawn care," and
that "the provision was struck down because it represented a blatantly
unconstitutional extension of the powers of the federal government."276
268. See supra note 153.
269. Michael Kelly, Cuomo s Thought Police, WASH. POST, May 17, 2000, at A27.
270. Todd Gaziano, Rule of Law; Separation of Powers Lives, WASH. TIMES, May 16, 2000,
at A21, LEXIS, News & Business, News, The Washington Post.
271. James Kilpatrick, Lopez Lives, POST AND COURIER (Charleston, SC), May 20, 2000,
atA] 1.
272. Leo, supra note 249.
273. Id.
274. Anne M. Hayes, Some on Court Neglect Constitution, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SER-
VICE, May 18, 2000, LEXIS, News & Business, News, Scripps Howard News Service.
275. Gitz, supra note 264.
276. Id.
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Lawyer Mark A. Perry concluded that "[t]he majority reasoning was
straightforward and compelling"277 and that "[n]o one-including the
four dissenters-seriously contends that rape constitutes economic
activity." '278 A letter to the editor published in the Washington Post said:
"As the court majority pointed out, domestic violence is not commerce.
Nor does it typically cross state lines., 279 Attorney Bruce Fein, who testi-
2810fled against the provision when it was before Congress, said of the
Court's ruling, "In other words, the theoretical cornerstone of VAWA
was boundless. Any non-commercial behavior with a derivative impact
on the national economy no matter how remote and featherlike would
be exposed to congressional regulation.,
28'
Law Professor Peter M. Shane was one of the proponents of the
VAWA remedy to counter the argument that rape is not commerce and
therefore cannot be regulated under the Commerce Clause. "Yes, it is
common sense that rape is not commerce,"282 he said, "[b]ut it is hardly
common sense that Congress's power to promote commerce is so lim-
ited that it cannot legislate against a practice that costs the national
economy billions of dollars annually, including the burdens of absentee-




Some commentators said that by overturning Congress's statute,
the Court had engaged in unacceptable judicial activism and under-
mined democratic decision-making.2 4 Librarian Sara D. Knapp said
277. Mark A. Perry, Justices Upheld the Constitution, NAT'L L. J., June 5, 2000, at A18,
LEXIS, News & Business, News, The National Law Journal. Perry is a partner in the
Washington, D.C. office of Los Angeles' Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher L.L.P.
278. Id.
279. David Bernstein, Editorial, Affirming Federalism, WASH. POST, May 30, 2000, at
A18.
280. In his testimony, Fein objected to the fact that VAWA would interfere with a state's
choice not to criminalize spousal rape-a choice that, he said, states should be free to
make based on "local customs." See Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House of Representatives
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 27 (1993) (statement of Bruce Fein, attorney);
see also Goldfarb, infra note 391.
281. Bruce Fein, Commentary, Arresting Mission Creep, WASH. TIMES, May 23, 2000, at
A18.
282. Shane, supra note 260.
283. Id.
284. Sara D. Knapp, Just Who Really Poses a Threat to Our Freedom?, TIMES UNION (Al-
bany NY), May 30, 2000, at A8. Knapp is a librarian at the University at Albany.
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that it was the Supreme Court, not Congress, that overstepped.285 Law
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky said that the "Reagan and Bush justices
are engaged in aggressive conservative judicial activism." '286 Law Profes-
sor Susan Estrich contended that "Chief Justice Rehnquist becomes the
sort of activist-jurist that conservatives are usually the first to criticize,
287
when federalism is at issue. Another law professor, Herman Schwartz,
asserted that "in a burst of judicial activism, the U.S. Supreme Court's
five conservative justices fired another salvo in their jihad against the
federal government.""" Law professor Larry Kramer found the ruling
astonishing "from a court that professes to care about democratic ma-
jorities and respect the political process., 289 "This is radical stuff.
Previous courts have exercised aggressive judicial review, but never like
this."'290 Senator Biden accused the Court of being too eager to "substi-
tute its own judgment for that of the political branches democratically
elected by the people to do their business."'29 ' Stephen Pomper, writing
for the Washington Monthly, remarked that "in more balanced times, the




Editorials advanced arguments similar to those presented in
commentary pieces. 29' A number of newspapers viewed the decision as a
285. Id.
286. Erwin Chemerinsky, Perspective on Justice, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 2000, at B11,
LEXIS, News & Business News, Los Angeles Times. Chermerinsky is a law professor
at the University of Southern California.
287. Susan Estrich, Perspective, Losers in the Federalism Game, DENVER POST, May 21,
2000, at K2. Estrich is a law professor and contributing editor of the Los Angeles
Times.
288. Herman Schwartz, Assault on Federalism Swipes at Women, L.A. Times, May 21,
2000, at M 11. Schwartz is a law professor at American University.
289. Larry Kramer, The Arrogance of the Court, WASH. POST, May 23, 2000, at A29.
Kramer is a law professor at New York University.
290. Id.
291. Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., A Women s Right to Sue an Attacker Must be Made by Con-
gress, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, May 22, 2000, at B6, LEXIS, News & Business,
News, Ventura County Star.
292. Stephen Pomper, The Gipper's Constitution, WASH. MONTHLY, Dec. 1999, at 27-28.
293. Forty-three papers printed editorials expressing their views on the Supreme Court's
decision in Morrison. After the Court's decision, fourteen papers expressed opposition
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loss for civil rights and said that the federal role had been appropriate.
The New York Times said that the Court's decision "provided
confirmation that a narrow majority on the [C]ourt is determined to
reconfigure the balance between state and federal authority, even at the
expense of weakening civil rights." '294 The Times wrote that the Court's
decision undermined "Congress's traditional power to identify problems
that states cannot or will not adequately deal with and to fashion
national remedies.""' The Buffalo News said: "In its crusade to reclaim a
lost form of federalism, the United States Supreme Court ... made life
harder for victims of sex crimes while calling into question the durability
of federal laws governing civil rights and child labor." '296 The St. Louis
Post-Dispatch accused the Court of putting states first "[i]n the battle
between civil rights and states' rights.""' The Press Enterprise said that
the "right to obtain a measure of justice through the federal courts is as
important and as strongly rooted in the Constitution as states' rights." '298
The Record, of Bergen County, New Jersey said, "In several recent
rulings, including [Morrison], the five justices harken back to an era of
state sovereignty that proceeded the federal civil rights and
environmental movements .... Civil rights and environmental laws
follow in the tradition of congressional action in other areas-child
labor, minimum wage, workplace safety-where Congress has stepped
in when states would not act." '299 The Baltimore Sun accused the Court
of striking "a blow to th& constitutional framework that for more than 50
years has provided a secure foundation for the federal government's power
to regulate the economy and combat discrimination., 30 0 The Kansas City
Star said that the remedy "gave women a way to take matters into their
own hands if local law enforcement officials turned their backs. , 301 It
wrote that by leaving relief for victims of gender-motivated crimes to the
to the decision, twenty-eight expressed support for the decision, and one fell in be-
tween. See supra notes 129-32.
294. Violence Against the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2000, at A22.
295. Id.
296. An Erosion of Rights, BUFFALO NEWS, May 18, 2000, at 2B, LEXIS, News & Busi-
ness, News, The Buffalo News.
297. Sacrificing Women's Rights, Editorial, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 16, 2000, at
B6, LEXIS, News & Business, News, St. Louis Post Dispatch.
298. In the Name of States' Rights, Editorial, PREss-ENTERPRISE, May 18, 2000, at A10,
LEXIS, News & Business, News, The Press Enterprise.
299. The Court Goes Backwards: An Activist Majority Seeks a States Rights Era, Editorial,
RECORD (Bergen County NJ), May 18, 2000, at L10.
300. Sacrificing Women 's Rights, supra note 297, at B6.
301. Rape Ruling Could Endanger Hate Crime Laws, Editorial, KANSAS CITY STAR, May 19,
2000, at B6.
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state courts, "the Supreme Court is sanctioning a spotty system of
justice for these victims. ' 30 2 The Seattle Post Intelligencer said that the
civil rights provision had provided "a similar extension of legal avenues
for women who are raped and beaten" to the civil rights act for African
Americans. 3
The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel took a somewhat different position
from other supporters of the federal remedy. It categorized the VAWA
provision as regulating crime but stated, nevertheless, that federal inter-
vention was appropriate. The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel argued that
"federal intervention in the criminal arena is sometimes apt, particularly
when the national government is filling a conspicuous vacuum in local
and state law enforcement."' '
Quite a few editorials framed the provision as regulating crime
rather than discrimination; yet most took a position contrary to the
Milwaukee paper and argued that crime should not be federalized. The
Atlanta Journal and Constitution said that "[r] ape is not discrimination;
it is a crime. ' ' An editorial in the Herald (Rock Hill, S.C.) called the
remedy a "hate crime law" not a "civil rights law."'" The Herald wrote,
"[iln the past, Congress has used that provision to exert its authority in
enforcing laws, notably civil rights laws. But using the commerce clause
to justify federal hate crime laws stretches the meaning of the clause
beyond reason."3 °7 The Herald-Sun (Durham, N.C.) said that the Court
had "restrained once again federalization of local criminal offenses."30
The Seattle Times said that the Court ruled correctly because "[t]he
federalization of crime is an unwelcome trend."3 '' The Boston Herald
said that "[a]bsent a pressing national need, crimes should be dealt with
where they occur."310 The Atlanta Journal and Constitution claimed that
"the Constitution has made it clear since 1789 that the federal
government does not have the authority to legislate in the area of
302. Id.
303. Court Misguided on States' Rights, Editorial, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, May 21,
2000, at F2.
304. Door Slammed On Rape Victims, Editorial, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 19, 2000,
at 22A.
305. Do More to Protect Women From Rape, Editorial, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 18,
2000, at 18A.
306. Congress Oversteps Bounds, Editorial, HERALD (Rock Hill, SC), May 22, 2000, at 7A.
307. Id.
308. Issues for the States, Editorial, HERALD-SUN (Durham, NC), May 21, 2000, at Al 8.
309. High Court Rape Ruling Sets Appropriate Limit, Editorial, SEATTLE TIMES, May 16,
2000, at B6.
310. Rape Ruling is Right Thing, Editorial, BOSTON HERALD, May 17, 2000, at 34.
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ordinary, individual, local criminal conduct.0 1 1 Interestingly, the
Atlanta Journal and Constitution had supported the enactment of
VAWA." 2 The Courier-Journal also put the VAWA provision in the
category of "criminal," rather than "civil rights," legislation. It wrote:
"Long ago, it was recognized that in some areas-and civil rights is
one-federal authority is vital to ensure uniform protection. But
criminal law historically has been a local matter. With limited
exceptions ... it should remain that way. U.S. v. Morrison is
confirmation of that view."3"' Finally, the Providence-Journal-Bulletin
argued that "these matters have been traditionally viewed as topics for
the states to handle.
3 14
c. Regulating Commerce or Crime?
Another point of disagreement among editorials was whether the
VAWA provision regulated an activity with a sufficient connection to
interstate commerce. Some editorials emphasized the lack of connection
that they saw between "rape"-what they categorized the civil rights
provision as regulating-and "commerce." The National Review stated
that "assaults have nothing to do with commerce. 3 5 The Seattle Times
agreed with the Court's ruling and said that "[r]ape is not commerce.
3 1 6
The Providence-Journal-Bulletin called Congress's justification for its
Commerce Clause power to enact VAWA "far-fetched." 7 The Atlanta
Journal and Constitution called Congress's Commerce Clause argument
"unreasonable.
31 8
Many other editorials said that the enactment of the civil rights
remedy stretched Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The
Sun-Sentinel of Fort Lauderdale, Florida said that the government's
argument "stretch[ed] the commerce clause beyond recognition."3" 9 The
311. High Court Wisely Keeps Limits on Federal Authority, Editorial, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
May 17, 2000, at A14.
312. Safe at Home?, supra note 162.
313. Not a Federal Case, Editorial, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, KY), May 18, 2000, at
10A, LEXIS, News & Business, News, The Courier-Journal (Louisville, KY).
314. The Federal-State Balance, Editorial, PROVIDENCE-JOURNAL-BULLETIN, May 20, 2000,
at 4B, LEXIS, News & Business, News, Providence Journal Bulletin.
315. The Week, Editorial, NAT'L REV., June 5, 2000, at 8.
316. High Court Rape Ruling Sets Appropriate Limit, supra note 309.
317. The Federal-State Balance, supra note 314, at 4B.
318. High Court Wisely Keeps Limits on Federal Authority, supra note 311.
319. Court Wisely Curtails Federal Power, Editorial, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, FL),
May 21, 2000, at 4G, LEXIS, News & Business, News, Sun-Sentinel.
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Tampa Tribune said the Commerce Clause reasoning was a "terrific
stretch, 3' 0 and the Christian Science Monitor said that the argument
"clearly stretched Congress's constitutional power., 321 The Christian
Science Monitor, like the Atlanta Journal and Constitution, had supported
the enactment of VAWA.322 The Las Vegas Review-Journal said that the
Commerce Clause had been "stretched to justify the federal
government's intervention into virtually every aspect of modern life.,
323
The Herald, of Rock Hill, South Carolina, also described Congress's
argument as a "stretch.,
324
But other newspapers disagreed. The Buffalo News pointed out that
previous civil rights statutes were based on similar Commerce Clause
reasoning and reminded readers that "the landmark Civil Rights Act of
1964 is also predicated on the Commerce Clause., 325 The Seattle Post-
Intelligencer said:
Violent crime against women costs this country at least $3 bil-
lion a year. More than one million women seek medical
assistance each year for injuries inflicted by their husbands or
partners. This doesn't amount to significant economic activity?
And women, like blacks before them, aren't hindered from
fully participating in the national economy?
3 26
Similarly, the Austin American-Statesman wrote that "after four
years of hearings, Congress recognized the volumes of evidence showing
that violence against women had a negative effect on the national econ-
omy, with billions of dollars in lost jobs and lowered productivity." '327
III. CONCLUSIONS BY COURTS
Although the Supreme Court ultimately rejected the categorization
of gender-motivated violence as a civil rights issue and an issue of federal
concern, most courts that considered the constitutionality of the
320. Court Checks Overreaching Congress, Editorial, TAMPA TRIB., May 16, 2000, at 10,
LEXIS, News & Business, News, The Tampa Tribune.
321. The Court Draws a Line, Editorial, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR, May 17, 2000, at 10.
322. See supra note 163.
323. Limits on Power, Editorial, Los VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, May 16, 2000, at 6B.
324. Congress Oversteps Bounds, supra note 296.
325. An Erosion of Rights, supra note 287.
326. Court Misguided on States 'Rights, supra note 303.
327. Taking Away Women s Protection, Editorial, AusTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, May 19,
2000, at A] 4.
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provision found that Congress had acted within its Commerce Clause
powers. Courts distinguished the VAWA provision from Lopez. They
pointed out that the civil remedy was supplemental and did not
supplant state criminal law. They also emphasized the similarities
between the civil rights remedy and previous federal civil rights statutes.
A. Lower Federal Courts
A number of lower federal courts upheld the constitutionality of
VAWA and agreed with Congress's characterization of the law as regu-
lating civil rights. These courts distinguished the remedy from the
criminal provision at issue in Lopez. In Timm v. Delong, a woman
brought a VAWA claim against her husband, alleging that he had physi-
cally and sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions. The court,
upholding the constitutionality of the VAWA remedy, said that
"[u]nlike the statutory provision in Lopez, the civil rights provision of
VAWA is not a criminal statute and does not inhibit state criminal pro-
ceedings against those who commit violence against women. 32 9 In
contrast to "the statute invalidated in Lopez, VAWA does not occupy a
legal realm where '[s] tates lay claim by right of history or expertise.'""'o
In Crisonino v. New York City Housing Authority, a case where a woman
brought a VAWA claim against her employer alleging that he physically
assaulted her, the court stated that "unlike the law at issue in Lopez,
which the Supreme Court characterized as a 'sharp break with the long-
standing pattern of federal ... legislation,' the [provision] fits squarely
within the tradition of federal civil rights legislation."
33'
Other courts stated that the federal civil rights provision
supplemented, but did not displace, state criminal law by creating a civil
remedy for survivors of gender-based violence. In Doe v. Mercer, the
plaintiff sued three men, alleging that they had raped her. The court
upheld the provision against the defendants' constitutional challenge
stating: "The VAWA does not encroach on the police powers of the
States or intrude in the execution of state criminal laws."332 The court
continued, "Congress has not usurped the power of the States to
328. 59 F. Supp.2d 944 (D. Neb. 1998).
329. Id. at 955-56.
330. Id.
331. Crisonino v. New York City Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
The plaintiff alleged that her employer called her a "dumb bitch" and shoved her,
causing her to fall to the ground. Id. at 389.
332. Doe v. Mercer, 37 F. Supp. 2d 64, 69 (D. Mass. 1999).
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provide parallel civil remedies. 3 ' The court in Doe v. Doe similarly said
that the remedy "does nothing to infringe on a state's authority to arrest
and prosecute an alleged batterer on applicable criminal charges., 34 In
this case, the plaintiff sued her husband, alleging that he had caused her
extreme emotional distress by inflicting a violent pattern of physical and
mental abuse and cruelty upon her and forcing her to perform manual
labor. The court, rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of the
remedy stated, "VAWA does not encroach on traditional areas of state
law; it complements them by recognizing a societal interest in ensuring
that persons have a civil right to be free from gender-based violence. 
35
In Doe v. Hartz,336 a case in which a parishioner brought a VAWA
action against her parish priest and the local catholic diocese, the court
affirmed the categorization of the VAWA provision as a civil rights
remedy. The court concluded that the remedy "has been cast as a civil
rights statute, not a criminal statute, and thus falls within the traditional
purview of federal regulation. Just as importantly, the statute defers to
state definitions of crimes and clearly supplements rather than supplants
state regulation of criminal and family law matters. 3 7 In Anisimov v.
Lake, a woman brought a VAWA action against her employer.33 ' The
court upheld the constitutionality of the VAWA provision stating that
"[u]nlike the statute at issue in Lopez, the Civil Rights Remedy provided
by the VAWA was not designed to duplicate or usurp the authority of
the States." The court said that the remedy was instead "designed to
redress an area of civil rights violations that were not being adequately
protected by the states. The Supreme Court has historically recognized
that the power of Congress in the field of civil rights is broad and
sweeping. 4° In Ziegler v. Ziegler, the plaintiff brought a VAWA action
against her husband, alleging a number of abusive acts including rape
and gender-specific epithets.34' The court disputed the defendant's
argument that the provision was related to family law and thus an
improper realm for federal involvement. The court said that the
333. Id.
334. Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 616 (D. Conn. 1996).
335. Id.
336. Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
337. Id. at 1423.
338. Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. I11. 1997). The plaintiff alleged that her
employer made inappropriate sexual advances toward her including: fondling her; at-
tempting to remove her clothing; grabbing her breasts; assaulting and attempting to
rape her; and ultimately luring her to a deserted office site and raping her. Id. at 532.
339. Id. at 540.
340. Id. (quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964)).
341. Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F. Supp. 2d 601, 605 (E.D. Wash. 1998).
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defendant's characterization of the provision "as dealing with state
family law issues ... belies the plain language of the statute and





Other courts stressed the connection between interstate commerce
and gender-motivated violence and likened VAWA to earlier civil rights
legislation enacted under Congress's commerce powers. For example, in
Culberson v. Doan,343 the court analogized gender-motivated violence to
"the burdens on interstate commerce due to racial discrimination that
renecessitated congressional intervention in Heart of Atlanta Motel and
Katzenbach. 3" The court agreed with Congress's determination that
"the aggregate effect of violence against women substantially burdens
interstate commerce, namely by decreasing business activities, hindering
women's willingness to travel, and preventing women from full partici-
pation in the overall marketplace of the nation., 345 The court concluded
that "VAWA is consistent with other civil rights legislation enacted by
Congress and upheld by the courts as constitutional under the Com-
merce Clause. 3 4 6 In Liu v. Strli, 4 7 a graduate student brought suit
against a professor at her university, alleging rape and sexual harassment.
The court rejected the defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of
the remedy, concluding that the "method of enforcing civil rights stat-
utes, granting private litigants the statutory power to protect their own
civil rights through the courts, has been adopted by Congress in other
statutory schemes and has continually received the approval of the fed-
eral courts. 348 In Ericson v. Syracuse University,'4' two former players on
the Syracuse University women's tennis team brought a VAWA claim
against their former coach. The court upheld the VAWA remedy stating
342. Id. at 612.
343. Culberson v. Doan, 65 F. Supp. 2d 701 (S.D. Ohio 1999). In this case the parents of
a deceased woman brought a VAWA claim against her former boyfriend alleging
physical abuse.
344. Id. at 713. In Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), the Court upheld Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a valid exercise of commerce power. The Court
held it was within the power of Congress to prohibit racial discrimination in restau-
rants because the discrimination interfered with the ability of African Americans to
travel and thus obstructed interstate commerce. In Heart ofAtlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), decided the same day, the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Civil Rights Act against a challenge by hotels and motels.
345. Culberson, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 713.
346. Id. at 71 4 .
347. Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp.2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999).
348. Id. at 478.
349. Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 45 F. Supp.2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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that "[w]here the states fail to exercise their police powers to combat a
form of anti-social activity-violence against women-that also nega-
tively impacts interstate commerce, the federal government need not
likewise default but may instead seek to remedy these indirect but sub-
stantial injuries to the functioning of the national economy.,
3 5 0
As these opinions demonstrate, the vast majority of courts to con-
sider the Act accepted Congress's characterization of the statute as a civil
rights remedy. With the exception of the courts that considered the
Brzonkala (Morrison) case, only one other court found the statute un-
constitutional. 51
B. The Morrison/Brzonkala Cases
1. District Court Opinion
The district court in Brzonkala emphasized the similarities it saw
between the VAWA provision and the statute at issue in Lopez. Accord-
ing to the court, although the characterization of the statute as civil is
"technically a correct statement," VAWA is, nonetheless, criminal in
nature because it was "designed to address problems in the state criminal
justice system." 52 The court said that the relevant categorization was not
whether the remedy was a criminal or civil law, but whether the activity
regulated was economic or non-economic in nature. The court reasoned
that "whether a statute based on the Commerce Clause is civil or crimi-
nal is of limited relevance., 353 According to the court, "[w]ith statutes
350. Id. at 348.
351. Bergeron v. Bergeron, 48 F. Supp. 2d 628 (M.D. La. 1999). In Bergeron a woman
brought a VAWA claim against her former husband alleging battery and attempted
rape during their marriage. The court, considering the constitutionality of the
VAWA remedy, agreed with the Fourth Circuit that the application of the provision
would "constitute a 'sweeping intrusion' into areas of traditional state concern, par-
ticularly as the statute applies to domestic violence." Id. at 635-36. The court noted
that "[t]here can be no dispute that in the case at bar, plaintiff is attempting to apply
the Act to a classic case of domestic violence since it involves a former husband and
wife and incidents during marriage." Id. at 636 n.10. The court said it agreed with
the Fourth Circuit that "there is no manifest connection between the regulated con-
duct (particularly as it pertains to domestic violence) and interstate commerce," id. at
637, and concluded that "Congress exceeded the bounds of its authority under the
Commerce Clause by enacting § 13981. This law is legislation regulating domestic
violence, not commerce." Id. at 638.
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regulating intrastate activities, the primary concern is whether the activ-
ity is economic. ',3" The court concluded that if "VAWA is a permissible
use of the commerce power because of the regulated activity's effect on
the national economy, which in turn affects interstate commerce, then it
would be inconsistent to deny the commerce power's extension into
family law, most criminal laws, and even insomnia." '355 Despite the fact
that there are many federal criminal laws and federal laws that regulate
families,356 the court defined these categories of activities as outside of
the proper realm of Congress.
2. Fourth Circuit Opinions
A panel on the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's
holding. 57 The court then heard the case en banc and reversed the
panel's decision. The en banc opinion began by describing the provision
as a remedy that "federally punishes noncommercial intrastate
violence." '358 The court referred to the remedy throughout the opinion as
"section 13981," thus de-emphasizing the fact that Congress had called
it a civil rights remedy. The court first referenced the provision by the
name Congress gave when it wrote, "[a] ppellants also argue that section
13981 is a 'civil rights' statute."359 The court chose instead to categorize
the remedy as regulating criminal conduct. It said that "although [the
provision] provides a civil remedy, the underlying conduct to which the
remedy attaches is violent crime, conduct that has traditionally been
regulated by the States through their criminal codes and laws of
354. Id.
355. Id. at 793.
356. Resnik, supra note 13.
357. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997). The
court stated:
VAWA legislates in an area-civil rights-that has been a federal responsi-
bility since shortly after the Civil War. Furthermore, federal action is
particularly appropriate when, as here, there is persuasive evidence that the
States have not successfully protected the rights of a class of citizens. In
passing VAWA Congress made extensive and convincing findings that state
law had failed to successfully address gender-motivated violence against
women.
Id. at 971.
358. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1999) (en
banc).
359. Id. at 852.
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intentional torts."36 The court continued, "it is clear that the balance
between federal and state responsibility for the control of violent crime
is implicated not only by federal criminal statutes, but also by any
federal sanction for such crime, even in the form of civil remedy."36'
The Fourth Circuit also argued that the VAWA provision regulated
a specific kind of violence-domestic violence-which, according to the
court, is "a type of violence that, perhaps more than any other, has tra-
ditionally been regulated not by Congress, but by the several States.
3 62
The court said that although "such violence is not itself an object of
family law-an area of law that clearly rests at the heart of the tradi-
tional authority of the States ... issues of domestic violence frequently
arise from the same facts that give rise to issues such as divorce and child
custody, which lie at the very core of family law." '363 The court argued
for preserving the traditional responsibility of states for regulating vio-
lence within families: "Section 13981 also sharply curtails the States'
responsibility for regulating the relationships between family members
by abrogating interspousal and intrafamily tort immunity, the marital
rape exemption, and other defenses that may exist under state law by
virtue of the relationship that exists between the violent actor and vic-
tim." '364 The court argued that states should be able to decide for
themselves whether to intervene and stop violence within families. In
the court's opinion, "the fact remains that these policy choices have tra-
ditionally been made not by Congress but by the States. By entering
into this most traditional area of state concern, Congress has ... sub-
stantially reduced the States' ability to calibrate the extent of judicial
supervision of intrafamily violence ....
The Fourth Circuit additionally emphasized the lack of connection
between gender-motivated violence and commerce arguing that "we can
discern no such distinct nexus between violence motivated by gender
animus and interstate commerce. '  The court described gender-
motivated crime as "an activity that has nothing to do with com-
merce" 367 and stressed the differences between the VAWA provision and
previous federal civil rights laws. 60
360. Id. at 840 (citations omitted).
361. Id. at 841.
362. Id. at 842.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 843.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 838.
367. Id. at 844.
368. Id. at 852.
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3. Supreme Court Opinion
The district court, the Fourth Circuit, and finally the Supreme
Court, resisted the attempt by activists and Congress to re-categorize
violence against women as a civil rights issue. The Supreme Court ma-
jority began its opinion by noting that, "[i]n these cases we consider the
constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which provides a federal civil
remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence."36' The Court also
referred to the remedy through out the opinion as "§ 13981." 3 70 The
only time the Court connected the words "civil rights" to the remedy
was when it noted that Congress said that it was establishing a
"'[flederal civil rights cause of action.' 071 Justice Souter, on the other
hand, referred to the remedy throughout his dissent by the name Con-
gress gave it: "The civil rights remedy.
372
The Supreme Court categorized the activity regulated by VAWA as
"crime" and emphasized that regulating crime was a traditional state
function.3 73 The Court said that "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence
are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity," and that the link
between gender-motivated crime and commerce was too "attenuated." '374
The Court said that if it upheld this provision, the reasoning could be
"applied equally as well to family law and other areas of traditional state
regulation." 375 The Court concluded, "[w]e accordingly reject the argu-
ment that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal
conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate
commerce. ' 376 For the Supreme Court, the relevant categories were
"crime" and "noneconomic," not "discrimination" and "civil rights."
369. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000).
370. Id. at 601-27.
371. Id. at 607.
372. Id. at 628-54 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined
this dissent.
373. Id. at 618 ("[W]e can think of no better example of the police power, which the
Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the sup-
pression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.").
374. Id. at 613.
375. Id. at 615.
376. Id. at 617.
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IV. A FAILED CATEGORY CHANGE?
Why did commentators, newspaper editors, and finally the major-
ity of the Supreme Court reject Congress's view that some types of
violence against women are civil rights offenses and activities that the
federal government can regulate? Opponents of the remedy were unable
to accept the categorization of the VAWA provision as a civil rights law.
This may have been due, in part, to the facts of the Morrison case itself.
To many observers, the case looked like a "rape case."
The characterization of the remedy by some courts, commentators,
and newspaper reporters as criminal and non-economic may have been a
result of the process psychologists refer to as "categorization."
Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross discuss various heuristics or mental
shortcuts, that people use to make decisions.377 The "representativeness
heuristic" involves "the application of relatively simple resemblance or
'goodness of fit' criteria to problems of categorization. 3 78 In making a
judgment, people assess the degree to which features of the object are
similar to features of the familiar category.379 Nisbett and Ross argue
that the representative heuristic is "a legitimate, indeed absolutely essen-
tial cognitive tool.,
380
Although categorization may be a necessary cognitive tool, scholars
have pointed out that the categories in which people place events do not
preexist in the word but are created. "' Although putting an activity or
event into a certain category may feel "natural," scholars argue that the
ease one feels putting behavior into categories may be influenced by
how accessible a certain category is. People may use "the felt ease of
377. RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOM-
INGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 17-42 (1980).
378. Id. at 24.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 27. "Countless inferential tasks, especially those requiring induction or gener-
alization, depend on deciding what class or category of event one is observing; such
judgments inevitably hinge upon assessments of resemblance or representations." Id.
381. Douglas L. Medin, Concepts and Conceptual Structures, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1469
(1989). "It is tempting to think of categories existing in the world" but it is "mislead-
ing" to do so because "people may impose rather than discover structure in the
world." Id. at 1469.
382. THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 475 (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, &
Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998). Analogous to the process of placing acts of"vio-
lence against women" in a category, is the process of assigning "traits" to people based
on observed behavior. Regarding trait categorization the Handbook says:
What is important about trait construct accessibility is that it produces
automatic behavior-to-trait encodings just as if the behavior was not am-
biguous but instead clearly diagnostic. The individual is not aware of the
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categorization as a cue to its validity, and trust perceptions that require
little or no effort more than those that do." '383 If the category is accessi-
ble, an individual may automatically assign behavior to it without
thinking about other options. The "ease of categorization" makes the
individual feel that the assignment of a particular behavior to a category
is valid. Challenging old or traditional categorizations can be difficult. 84
Much of the violence that women experience is in the home or by
people they know.8 Historically, states defined this violence as a pC-
vate" or "interpersonal" problem that was beyond the law's reach. In
more modern times, states began to prosecute these crimes. However,
female victims of violence in many places still faced discriminatory prac-
tices by police, prosecutors, and other members of state legal systems. 87
Drafters of VAWA's civil rights remedy tried to challenge existing cate-
gorizations of domestic violence and sexual assault. They tried to
redefine the violence as a matter of public and national concern; how-
ever, many resisted this category change. Pamela Coukos argues that
"[d] efining violence that society has historically treated as interpersonal
and private to be a matter of public concern like race discrimination
influence of accessibility on the ease or fluency of the perceptual process,
just that the behavior seemed clearly relevant to that trait and that no ef-
fortful search after meaning was necessary.
Id.
383. Id.
384. Nisbett and Ross discuss the resistance to category changes, even in the face of data
that challenge categorizations. NISBETT & Ross, supra note 377, at 167-92. Professor
Resnik also explores categorical reasoning in the VAWA context and discusses the
work of cognitive psychologists. Resnik, supra note 13, nn. 26-28; see also REBECCA
M. FRUMKINA & ALEXIE V. MIKHEJEV, MEANING AND CATEGORIZATION (1996);
KNOWLEDGE, CONCEPTS & CATEGORIES (Koen Lamberts & David Shanks, eds.
1997).
385. See Susan A. MacManus & Nikki R. VanHightower, Limits of State Constitutional
Guarantees: Lessons from Efforts to Implement Domestic Violence Policies, 49 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 269 (1989) (according to the Federal Bureau of Investigations, thirty
percent of women murdered in the United States are killed by husbands or boy-
friends; the United States Surgeon General reports battering as the leading cause of
injury to women).
386. See generally Siegel, supra note 4.
387. In the record before Congress, when it enacted VAWA, were reports on gender bias
from task forces established by judiciaries in 21 states. These reports documented dis-
criminatory practices against female victims of violence by police, prosecutors, judges,
and jurors. See, e.g., H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-711, at 385-86 (1994); S. Rep. No.
103-138, at 41-55 (1993); S. Rep. No. 102-197, at 33-35, 41, 43-47 (1991); see
also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 631 n.7 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(listing the reports); Resnik, supra note 13, at 627 n.16.
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forces a re-examination of deeply held views., 38" According to Coukos,
"[t]he private and interpersonal aspects of the violence... seem far from
the very public principles that anti-discrimination statutes represent.),389
Some judges and individuals in the media were not accustomed to
thinking of domestic violence and sexual assault as problems of group-
based discrimination with economic consequences. Placing this violence
in the categories of non-economic, local, or domestic relations law may
have felt more natural for some. Sally Goldfarb examines how the civil
rights remedy challenged the traditional distinction that the law made
between the public and private spheres.9 0 Goldfarb says that the Com-
merce Clause challenge to VAWA affirmed that violence against women
is too removed from the public sphere of the market. According to
Goldfarb, the claim that the VAWA remedy was unconstitutional relied
on the assumption that violence against women is private.39' Goldfarb
explains that "while the marketplace was viewed as public and therefore
an appropriate subject for legal intervention, the domestic sphere was
idealized as a private realm in which affection, not law, would rule;
therefore, the law adopted a policy of refusing to intrude in the fam-
ily. 392 Goldfarb argues:
The claim that family issues exclusively inhabit the state courts
is as inaccurate as the claim that women exclusively inhabit the
domestic sphere. Characterizing family claims as devoid of
monetary value is as false as characterizing family life as insu-
lated from market forces. The view that the federal law does
not intervene in family is as flawed as the view that the law in
general does not do so. 3
The notion that violence against women is "private" and removed
from the market makes it harder to see the civil rights remedy as analo-
gous to other federal civil rights statutes, and proper for regulation
under the Commerce Clause.
Victoria Nourse predicted, when the bill was before Congress, that
many critics would not accept the analogy made between the VAWA
388. Pamela Coukos, Deconstructing the Debate Over Gender and Hate Crimes Legislation,
11 GEo. J. GENDER & L. 11,35 (1999).
389. Id.
390. Sally Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1 (2000).
391. Id. at 20- 2 1.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 33.
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remedy and previous civil rights laws. 94 Nourse noted that, "[u]nlike the
racially-motivated violence first outlawed by Congress in the Recon-
struction era, violence perpetrated against women did not seem
primarily conspiratorial, widely identified with organized political
movements, or the product of publicly institutionalized slavery.
395
Nourse said that some VAWA critics found violence against women, as
compared with race-based violence, "far less political and far more per-
sonal; the product of private relationships, not public discrimination.,
396
She said that "its very commonness, its ubiquity, seemed to counsel
against the idea that violence [against women] discriminated. 39 7 Some
courts and commentators saw too many differences between gender-
motivated violence and the model of race discrimination. Without a
clear understanding of how violence against women can be discrimina-
tory conduct, these individuals placed the violence in the categories in
which it had been placed traditionally.
The discourse about the civil rights remedy could have been quite
different had a case with a different set of facts made its way to the Su-
preme Court. For example, had a case such as the Canadian incident
(where a man shot a number of female students while shouting "I hate
feminists") been brought under the VAWA provision, it might have
been easier for judges and the public to view the violence as discrimina-
tion and to categorize the VAWA remedy as a civil rights law.9 But a
primary purpose of the civil rights remedy was to show how cases that
courts have treated as "trivial" or "ordinary"-such as a rape on a college
campus-may be incidents of class-based discrimination and matters of
public concern. Litigating an extraordinary case, such as the Canadian
example, to the Supreme Court might have actually undermined the
goals of the VAWA provision: drafters wanted to shift the understand-
ing of violence against women so that all cases of violence against
women would be taken seriously. The scope of the remedy could have
been limited if such an extraordinary case was the "test" case because
judges might have used VAWA's animus requirement to limit the scope
of the remedy to cover only conduct that was as extreme, and as obvi-
ously motivated by gender, as the Canadian case.
Despite the Court's holding in Morrison, the attempt to categorize
violence against women as a civil rights issue has not necessarily failed.
394. Nourse, supra note 15, at 4.
395. Id. at 4.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 4.
398. See supra note 18.
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As explained above, many federal judges and a number of commentators
and editors agreed with Congress and embraced the concept that some
forms of violence against women are discriminatory.399 Now, several
states and localities are considering enacting their own "civil rights" pro-
visions to give victims of gender-motivated violence a remedy in state
courts. The category shift that proponents of VAWA attempted is now
being debated in state and local legislatures.
V. LOCAL EFFORTS
In December 2000, New York City's Council passed an ordinance
giving victims of gender-motivated violence a civil remedy. In January
2001, Westchester County, NY, passed a similar ordinance. Illinois,
New York State, Arizona, and Arkansas also have bills pending. The
drafters of remedies in states and localities face questions about how to
frame the rights and remedies they are creating. How broadly should
these remedies be drafted? Should states make it easier for all women to
sue or provide a remedy for only certain types of violence? Is structural
reform of the whole system the primary goal, or is framing the remedy
as a discrimination law most important?
Federalism arguments cannot be made against state and municipal
remedies; however, other arguments against these remedies have
emerged and will continue to emerge as more cities and states consider
enacting similar remedies. As discussed above, many of the arguments
made against the civil rights remedy were arguments against classifying
forms of violence against women as discrimination. These arguments,
and the arguments that VAWA discriminated against men and violated
the civil rights of defendants, can also be made against local remedies.
VAWA failed at the federal level in part because violence against women
has been viewed traditionally as a private and interpersonal matter that
the government should not regulate; some will not want to see the states
involved in this type of regulation either.
Despite possible objections, statutes at the local level still have the
potential to accomplish much more than a federal statute because the
concern about jurisdiction does not exist. Before VAWA was enacted,
critics complained that the remedy would overburden or flood the
federal courts. Because of this concern, drafters added the animus
requirement and also stated that the Act did not provide a cause of
action "for random acts of violence unrelated to gender or for acts that
cannot be demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, to be
399. See supra Parts J.A, .A.
[Vol. 9:327
COVERING WOMEN AND VIOLENCE
motivated by gender."400 VAWA supporters emphasized that not all acts
of violence against women would be within the scope of the Act. Only
acts that were clearly based on gender discrimination would be
covered.0 1
In the state context, however, the concerns about the constitution-
402ality of the remedy or of "flooding the federal courts" are not at issue.
The state and local acts, therefore, have the potential to accomplish
much more. Some of the local and state bills are more expansive than
the federal Act, while others are almost identical. This Part examines the
titles given to the bills, the language used in them, and the part of the
state or local code they amend to determine how drafters categorize
their efforts. Are these "civil rights" statutes or "domestic violence" stat-
utes? Drafters of the federal VAWA attempted to reclassify acts of
gender-motivated violence away from traditional tort and criminal law
categories to a civil rights paradigm. We can now see legislators and ac-
tivists attempting to make this shift at the local level as well.
400. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(1) (1994).
401. For example, Eleanor Holmes Norton wrote:
[VAWA] continue[s] a course Congress has already begun: to bring women
under civil rights protections similar to those blacks won as a result of the
Civil War .... Violence against a black by a white is sometimes, but not
always, a civil rights violation. The same is true of violence by a man
against a woman. The civil rights concept is precisely what makes the newfed-
eral remedy self-limiting and unlikely to overwhelm the courts.
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Federalizing Feminism: Protection of the Civil Rights of
Women Against Criminal Attacks Needs the Force of Federal Law, RECORDER, Aug. 11,
1994, at 8 (emphasis added). Senator Biden attempted to address concerns about
flooding the federal courts when he testified at House hearings in 1992. Biden em-
phasized that the provision did not "federalize" every violent act against women-it
did "not cover random beatings in the home or elsewhere. The only remedy [the pro-
vision] provide[d] is for violent crimes motivated by gender discrimination." Violence
Against Women: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Criminal Justice, S. Comm.
on theJudiciary, 102d Cong. 42 (1992), at 11 (statement of Senator Biden).
VAWA supporters also had to convince critics that the provision was constitu-
tional; thus, they emphasized the similarities between the VAWA provision and
previous civil rights laws enacted by Congress. See, e.g., Goldscheild, supra note 214
("Congress has full authority to enhance the VAWA civil rights remedy to combat
gender-based violent crime that violates women's civil rights, just as it passed Recon-
struction-era civil rights laws and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in a federal rejection of
discrimination and civil rights violations.").
402. There are, though, concerns about flooding the state courts. See Byrne, infra notes
423-29.
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A. Description of Local Efforts
1. Enacted Ordinances
On December 19, 2000, the former Mayor of New York City,
Rudolph W. Giuliani, signed a law passed by the City Council that gave
victims of gender-motivated violence a civil remedy.40 3 This ordinance
amended the "civil rights" title of New York City's Administrative
Code; 4°4 thus signaling that the City Council intended the law to fit into
the category of civil rights legislation. The New York City statute has
the same "animus" requirement that the Federal VAWA contained.4 5 It
also contains the limitation that no "random acts" of violence are
included within the statute's scope. 4°  Westchester County in New York
has passed an almost identical ordinance creating a civil remedy for
victims of gender-motivated violence. °7
The New York City ordinance received some media attention. A
summary of the ordinance in the "Metro Briefing" section of the New
York Times called the statute a "domestic violence bill., 40 ' The New York
Law Journal's headline read "Local Domestic Violence Law Elicits Ap-
plause and Questions. ,4° These labels suggest that the media saw the
legislation as a "domestic violence" law rather than a "civil rights" law.
Other papers viewed the ordinance as hate-crime legislation; for exam-
ple, the New York Post wrote in an editorial:
403. Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Act, N.Y., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE
§§ 8-901 to -905 (2002).
404. The law added Chapter 9 to Title 8 ("Civil Rights") of the New York City Adminis-
trative Code. Id.
405. A "'crime of violence motivated by gender'" is defined as "a crime of violence com-
mitted because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an
animus based on the victim's gender." N.Y., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-903(b) (2002).
406. Id. § 8-9054(b). ("[N]othing in this chapter entitles a person to a cause of action for
random acts of violence unrelated to gender or for acts that cannot be demonstrated,
by a preponderance of the evidence, to be motivated by gender .... ) Like the Fed-
eral VAWA, the statute awards attorneys fees and costs, id. § 8-904(3), and no
criminal complaint is required to sue under the statute, id. § 8-905(c). The statute of
limitations is seven years, id. § 8-905(a), which is longer than the federal VAWA's
statute of limitations (four years). The ordinance does not require the "crime of vio-
lence" to be a felony; misdemeanors also qualify. Id. § 8.903(a).
407. WESTCHESTER COUNTY, N.Y., LAWS OF WESTCHESTER COUNTY § 701.
408. MANHATrAN: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BILL, Metro Briefing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2000,
at B6.
409. Victoria Rivkin, Local Domestic Violence Law Elicits Applause and Questions, 224 N.Y.
L.J. 1, 2 (2000).
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[T]here are good reasons why this measure should not be en-
acted. Like all hate-crimes laws, it fosters the culture of
victimization. And it creates a special protected class in which
some victims are more equal than others. And it presupposes
that any attack by a man against a woman was motivated pri-
marily by gender bias.1
This editorial raises opposition to the ordinance similar to the ar-
guments made against the federal VAWA: 1) the remedy makes women
appear as victims; 2) the statute makes some victims "more equal" than
others; and 3) the statute incorrectly assumes that all male on female
violence is gender-motivated.
2. Pending State Legislation
a. Illinois
The Illinois legislature is considering a bill to provide a civil remedy
to victims of "gender-related" violence. The Illinois bill was first intro-
duced before VAWA was declared unconstitutional. "' The bill states
that "gender-related violence" is "a form of sex discrimination."4 12 Gen-
der-related violence is defined as: 1) an act of violence or physical
aggression satisfying Illinois's battery law' that is "committed, at least
in part, on the basis of a person's sex"; or 2) "a physical intrusion or
410. The City Council's Gift to Lawyers, N.Y. POST, Dec. 5, 2000, at 42.
411. H.B. 4407, 91st Gen. Assem. (111. 2000); see also Illinois Report, ST. JOURNAL-
REGISTER (Springfield, IL), Feb. 5, 2000, at 7, LEXIS, News & Business, News, The
State Journal-Register (Springfield, IL). The bill did not pass during the 1999-2000
legislative session but was reintroduced at the beginning of the 2000-2001 session.
The Illinois House, by a unanimous vote, passed a version of the bill on March 28,
2001. See H.B. 1414, 92d Gen. Assem. (I11. 2001) (engrossed version). The Senate
did not pass the bill in that session. See Dave McKinney & James Fuller, House OKs
abuse-victim suits for money damages, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, Mar. 29, 2001, at 18. The
current version of the bill is the "Gender Violence Act," H.B. 536, 93d Gen. Assem.
(11. 2003) (engrossed version). This bill was passed unanimously by the Illinois
House on March 6, 2003, and has not yet been passed by the Senate. See Illinois
General Assembly, Bill Status for H.B. 536, available at http://www.legis.state.il.us/.
412. H.B. 536, 93d Gen. Assem. § 5 (Il. 2003) (engrossed version).
413. Id. § 5(1). Whether or not those acts have resulted in criminal charges, prosecution,
or conviction.
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physical invasion of a sexual nature under coercive conditions satisfying




The Illinois bill contains no animus requirement. Acts of violence
qualify, as long as they are either 1) on the "basis of a person's sex"; or
2) a "physical intrusion or physical invasion of a sexual nature under
coercive conditions satisfying the elements of battery., 45 Therefore, it
appears that all cases of rape or sexual assault would be covered. Finally,
the bill contains no limitation that "random" acts of violence are pre-
cluded.46
The Illinois bill has support from Governor George Ryan," 7 the
Governor's Commission on the Status of Women, the Illinois Coalition
Against Sexual Assault, and the Chicagoland Chamber of Commerce.418
There has been limited media commentary in support of the Illinois
Gender Violence Act;419 some who opposed the federal statute support
414. Id. § 5(2). A threat of an act described in § 5(1) or (2) is also covered. Id. § 5(3). The
bill provides a ten-year statute of limitations. Id. § 20.
415. Id. § 5(2) (111. 2003).
416. An earlier version of the bill, H.B. 3279, 92d Gen. Assem. (111. 2001), defined "gen-
der-related" violence as an act of violence "committed, at least in part, on the basis of
a person's sex, gender, or sexuality." The bill stated "sex, gender, or sexuality" in-
cludes, but is not limited to, "[a]ctual or attributed sexual orientation," "[aictual or
attributed gender identity," or "[a]ctual or attributed sex or gender role conformity or
nonconformity." H.B. 536, 93d Gen. Assem. § 5(2) (I11. 21)03) (engrossed version).
Courts had begun to interpret what "gender-motivated" violence was before the
VAWA remedy was declared unconstitutional. One court considered the complaint
of a prisoner who "was a transvestite who regularly dressed, groomed, and acted like a
woman while in prison." Thomasson v. United States, No. 99-3165-JTM, 1999 WL
69008, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 23, 1999). After being assaulted by other prisoners, this
prisoner brought a VAWA claim. The court granted the defendant's motion to dis-
miss, holding: "the complaint alleges not that Thomasson's fellow inmates were
motivated by an animus against his gender, but solely because of 'his gender orienta-
tion.' The court has not found any cases suggesting that violence against transvestites
fits within the scope of the VAWA." Id. at *2. The court found that VAWA's legisla-
tive history showed that "the consistent tenor has been Congress's concern about
violence against women." Id. The earlier version of the Illinois bill, H.B. 3279, would
appear to cover a case such as this one.
417. Governor Ryan's support for the bill began back in February of 2000. Press Release,
Gov. George Ryan, Governor Ryan Declares Support for the Gender Violence Act,
(Feb. 7, 2000), available at http://www.state.il.us/govlpressl00lfeb/gva.htm.
418. Dave McKinney & James Fuller, I-louse OKs Abuse-Victim Suitsfor Money Damages,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 29, 2001, at 18.
419. See, e.g., Steve Neal, Gender Violence Act Would Protect Women, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Feb. 9, 2000, at 8; A (Small) Step Against Violence, Editorial, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 14,
2000, at 14; Bill Would Enhance Justice for Women, Editorial, CH. DAILY HERALD,
Feb. 17, 2000, at 18; Gov. George Ryan, Judith A. Gold & Kaethe Morris Hoffer,
Gender Violence Act a Remedy for Victims, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 2, 2000, at 30
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the local efforts. The Chicago Sun Times agreed with the Supreme
Court's holding in Morrison: "This is a case where the federal govern-
ment nosed its way into yet another area in which it does not belong."42
It did not, however, oppose the Gender Violence Act in Illinois. "[The
Gender Violence Act's], value is mostly in making remedies already
available to women and gays more explicit to the lock-step legal system.
In the interest of justice for all, we can see no harm in that.
421
Some who opposed the civil rights remedy, however, also opposed
Illinois's efforts. According to Kaethe Morris Hoffer, a member of the
Governor's Commission on the Status of Women in Illinois, opposition
to the bill came mainly from those opposed to including remedies for
victims who are attacked because they are gay, perceived to be gay, "or
who otherwise do not conform to gender roles., 422 Some arguments
made against the bill were similar to those arguments made against
VAWA. Columnist Dennis Byrne, who supported the Supreme Court's
ruling in Morrison, opposed the Gender Violence Act. 42' Byrne said that
the Illinois bill "is unfair because the remedies are excessive and
precedent-setting, going beyond typical common law and many
statutes," 424 and that "[i]ts statute of limitations is too long." '425 He also
said the bill "undermines the process established by the Illinois Human
Rights Act, aimed at keeping the courts from being flooded by sex and
other discrimination claims, by requiring that they first be sent to the
(Gold is Chairwoman of the Governor's Commission on the Status of Women in Il-
linois; Morris Hoffer is a Commission member).
420. Clarifying Justice, Editorial, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 6, 2000, at 37.
421. Id.
422. Roger Miller, Speaker at ISU Backs Measure on Gender Violence; Bill Would Create
Civil Court Option, PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, IL.), Sept. 21, 2000, at A3; see also
Christi Parsons, New Rape Suit Law Is Pushed, Cm. TRIB., May 17, 2000, at N6.
The latest version of the bill does not cover crimes committed on the basis of sexual
orientation.
423. Dennis Byrne, Congress Knocked Down a Peg, Cm. SUN-TIMES, May 17, 2000, at 51.
According to Bryne:
liberals will have to bring their agenda back to the states and the people.
And in Illinois, that means the drums already are beating for the Gender
Violence Act, a first-of-its-kind piece of legislation that I've previously
noted is vague, unfair, unrealistic, poorly drafted, utterly useless and an as-
sault on common law and possibly free speech. Thankfully, it hasn't gone
anywhere in the Illinois Legislature.
Id.
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Illinois Human Rights Commission. Byrne's view that the statute
goes beyond "typical common law," and is an "assault on common
law"42 7 is analogous to the federalism argument made by opponents of
the federal VAWA. Reva Siegel has noted the similarities between
arguments against legal intervention into intrafamily violence and
federalism arguments made against the VAWA civil rights remedy.
4 28
Because federalism arguments cannot be made against state civil rights
remedies, common law arguments are now emerging. Byrne's
contention that we need to keep the courts "from being flooded by sex
and other discrimination claims" is similar to the argument that federal
courts should not be flooded with such matters; he thinks that state
courts do not have room for these problems either.
Other opponents of the Illinois bill voiced concerns about the po-
tential effects on men and defendants similar to those raised against
VAWA. A letter to the editor published in the Chicago Sun-Times ex-
pressed the concern that men are victims of domestic violence: "The
bill's framers assume that victims must be either female or homosexual.
Heterosexual men are implied as the abusers. Men are battered and
sexually abused in large numbers, but society is afraid to talk about
it.
' ' 429 The writer concluded that while the "Gender Violence Act is a
good step ... it should be made to help all victims-male and female.
The definition of sex discrimination should be changed so that it is bio-
logically neutral."3 Concern about the rights of defendants has also
been raised. The Pantagraph of Bloomington, Illinois wrote an editorial
against the bill saying that "this vague and overly broad legislation ...
could trap in its net innocent parties who would be stuck with large at-
torney's fees, time-consuming legal proceedings and the risk of large
monetary judgments." '431
426. Id.
427. Byrne, supra note 423.
428. Reva Siegel, supra note 4, at 2202 ("Federalism discourses about the family grew up
in intimate entanglement with the common law of marital status. Indeed, as we ex-
amine the claim that marriage is a state-law concern, it begins to appear that
federalism discourses about marriage bear strong family resemblances to common law
privacy discourses about marriage, and in some instances are even direct descendants
of the discourse of affective privacy.").
429. John Mitchell, Guys Can Suffer Too, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 3, 2000, at 34.
430. Id. In fact, the language of the bill is gender-neutral.
431. Bill Willis, No Need for Special Lawsuits Related to 'Gender Violence,' PANTAGRAPH
(Bloomington, IL), Feb. 18, 2000, at A16.
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b. New York State
The proposed New York State bill would amend the state's civil
rights law 32 and provide a civil cause of action for both "domestic vio-
lence" and "gender motivated violence. 433 "Domestic violence" is
defined as a crime or violation of the penal law "which has been alleged
to have been committed by any family or household member against
any member of the same family or household. 4 34 "Gender motivated
violence" is defined as a crime "committed because of gender, or on the
basis of gender, and due at least in part to an animus based on the vic-
tim's gender." '435 Filing of criminal charges is not required to bring a
claim under the bill."' The bill provides that any "person, entity, or en-
terprise" who commits an act of domestic violence or gender motivated
violence shall be liable to the injured party for the "recovery of three
times the compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declara-
tory relief' and attorney's fees and costs.4 37 The bill provides that no
cause of action shall exist for "random acts of violence unrelated to do-
mestic issues or gender or for acts that cannot be demonstrated by a
preponderance of evidence to have been committed on the basis of do-
mestic issues or gender and due at least in part to an animus based on
the victim's domestic situation or on the victim's gender.)
438
The scope of the New York bill is not clear from its text. The bill
appears to provide a cause of action for all victims of domestic violence;
however, it also provides that no random acts of violence are covered.
432. A.B. 6380, 226th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003). The bill would add a new section 44-
b to the state's civil rights law.
433. Id. § 3. The bill also prohibits certain activity: "It shall be unlawful for any person,
enterprise or any person employed or associated with any person or enterprise to con-
spire to, attempt to, or otherwise employ domestic violence or gender motivated
violence for any purpose." Id. § 2. Also introduced in New York is a bill that provides
a civil cause of action for violations of the State's hate crime law, which includes hate
crimes committed on the basis of sex and gender. S.B. 2776, 224th Ann. Leg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2001). A person is civilly liable if he or she acts with "the intent to deprive an
individual or group of individuals of the exercise of their civil rights because of the
individual's or individuals' . . . gender, sex .... Id. § 2. At least three states (Califor-
nia, Michigan, and Vermont) have passed hate crime statutes that include civil
penalties for gender-motivated violence. See CTR. FOR WOMEN POL'Y STUD., VIO-
LENCE AGAINST WOMEN As BIAs MOTIVATED HATE CRIMES: DEFINING THE ISSUE
15-17 (1991).
434. A.B. 6380, 226th Ann. Leg. Sess., § 1 (a) (N.Y. 2003).
435. Id. I l(b).
436. Id.
437. Id. § 3(a).
438. Id. § 3(c).
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To be covered under the New York bill, the act must be "due at least in
part to an animus based on the victim's domestic situation." It is not• • 439
clear how courts would interpret this animus provision.
c. Arizona
A bill was introduced in Arizona in 2000, but it did not pass.440 A
similar bill was introduced again in January 2001;44 it passed the State
Senate on March 7, 2001 by an 18-12 vote442 but has not yet passed the
House. The proposed bill "creates a state civil rights remedy for victims
of gender-motivated violence.""44 It defines an "act of violence motivated
by gender" as "an act of violence committed in whole or in any part on
the basis of gender and due in whole or in any part to an animus based
on the victim's gender.""' The bill includes a VAWA-like provision ex-
cluding a cause of action for "random acts of violence." There has
been very little media coverage of this bill.
46
439. The definition of gender motivated violence under the New York bill differs from the
VAWA definition: acts are gender motivated if they are "committed because of gen-
der, or on the basis of gender, or on the basis of gender and due at least in part to an
animus based on the victim's gender." Id. § 3(b) (emphasis added). Because of the use
of the word "or," an act is gender motivated if it is simply on the basis of gender
(with no showing of animus). However, section 3(c) appears to limit the cause of ac-
tion to acts "due at least in part to an animus based on ... the victim's gender." Id.
§ 3(c).
440. S.B. 1535, 44th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2000).
441. S.B. 1550, 45th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2001). The proposed bill would amend
Title 12 ("Courts and Civil Proceedings"), Chapter 6 ("Special Actions and Proceed-
ings by Individual Persons"), Article 12 ("Miscellaneous") of the Arizona Revised
Statute. The placement of the bill in this area of the code suggests that the remedy is
viewed as "miscellaneous" and does not fit into any other existing category such as
"civil rights" (unlike the New York City ordinance that amended the civil rights sec-
tion of the code). The "civil rights" section of the Arizona code is in Title 41 "State
Government," Chapter 9 "Civil Rights."
442. Capital Roundup, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Mar. 8, 2001, at AB4. It does not appear that
the bill has been introduced in the current legislative session.
443. Arizona State Senate, Fact Sheet for S.B. 1550 (prepared by Senate Staff, Feb. 16,
2001), available at http:llwww.azleg.state.az.usl.
444. S.B. 1550, § l(E)(2). This definition is slightly different from the VAWA definition.
The Arizona bill has a seven-year statute of limitations, id.. 1(D), and does not re-
quire a prior criminal complaint. Id. § 1 (C).
445. Id. § I(B).
446. The only article in the Lexis database to mention the bill noted that it had passed the
Senate. Capital Roundup, supra note 442, at AB4.
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d. Arkansas
A bill creating a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated vio-
lence has been introduced also in Arkansas. This bill received little
media attention.448 The Arkansas bill defines an "act of violence moti-
vated by gender" as "an act of violence committed because of gender or
on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on
the victim's gender., 4 9 An "act of violence means any violation of Ar-
kansas law where a person purposefully or knowingly causes, or
threatens to cause, death or physical injury to another person or persons,
specifically including rape."45 Although the Arkansas bill explicitly in-
cludes rape as an "act of violence," this does not mean that all rape
necessarily qualifies as "an act of violence motivated by gender." The act
of violence, the rape, still needs to be "motivated by gender"; it is un-
clear on the face of the Arkansas bill whether all rapes are considered
motivated by gender. The bill explicitly provides that an "act of violence
includes any violation of Arkansas law that would be a violent act as de-
scribed in subdivision (A) but for the relationship between the person
who commits the violation and the individual against whom the viola-
tion is committed."' As with the bills pending in other states, there is
no requirement in the Arkansas bill that a criminal charge be filed.452
B. Potential for Local Remedies
The Supreme Court's decision in Morrison encouraged a number of
states and localities to propose remedies similar to the federal VAWA.
These remedies, if enacted, could cover a broader range of conduct than
the federal remedy did and therefore be available to more victims of vio-
lence. There also is an educational benefit derived from the
consideration of this legislation at the state and local level. In addition
447. The Arkansas Domestic Violence Act of 2001, H.B. 1691, 83d Gen. Assem. (Ark.
2001). It does not appear that this bill has been introduced in the current legislative
session.
448. There is no mention of the bill in the Lexis database containing the major Arkansas
newspapers.
449. H.B. 1691, § l(b)(1). This is the same wording as the federal VAWA provision ex-
cept that it uses the phrase "act of violence" rather than "crime of violence."
450. Id. I 1(b)(2)(A).
451. Id. § 1 (b)(2)(B). Presumably this clause clarifies that marital or familial exemptions
do not apply.
452. Id. § l(e).
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to considering these specific civil remedies, states may also examine
other aspects of their court systems in an attempt to eliminate gender
bias. VAWA sought to provide a remedy to victims of gender-motivated
violence at the federal level because victims were being denied adequate
remedies at the local level. If localities now enact remedies and examine
their systems, these changes would address the concerns of VAWA pro-
ponents and could be much more far reaching than VAWA ever could
have been.
Statutes giving victims of gender-motivated violence a civil remedy
can do more to transform attitudes about gender-motivated violence
and the criminal justice system than state hate-crime statutes enhancing
penalties for gender or sex-based crimes or attaching civil remedies to
existing hate-crimes statutes." Gender has been added to hate-crime
statutes in a number of states.454 The addition of the word gender, un-
fortunately, tends to include little discussion about what a "gender-
based" crime actually is.455 Furthermore, very few prosecutions have
453. There are several articles that discuss defining rape as a gender-motivated crime or a
gender-based hate crime. See CTR. FOR WOMEN POL'Y STUD., supra note 433; Mar-
guerite Angelari, Hate Crime Statutes: A Promising Toolfor Fighting Violence Against
Women, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 63 (1994); Elizabeth A. Pendo, Recognizing Vio-
lence Against Women: Gender and the Hate Crimes Statistics Act, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 157 (1994); Eric Rothschild, Recognizing Another Face of Hate Crimes: Rape as
Gender-Bias Crime, 4 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 231 (1993).
454. According to the Anti-Defamation League, in 1990 only seven of the thirty-one states
that had hate crime statutes including gender. As of 2001, nineteen of the forty-one
statutes cover victims chosen by reason of their gender. Anti-Defamation League,
ADL Model Legislation and the Inclusion of Gender (2001), at http://www.adl.org
(last visited Oct. 13, 2002).
455. Congress debated (and the Senate passed) a federal hate crime bill that adds gender as
a protected category along with sexual orientation and disability. Although the inclu-
sion of sexual orientation in the bill received a lot of attention, the inclusion of
gender was rarely discussed. There was little discussion about the sort of crime that
would actually qualify as a gender-based hate crime under the proposed legislation.
Some writers said that the bill would make all rapes a federal crime, others noted
Orrin Hatch's comment that all rapes could be federal crimes under the bill. See, e.g.,
The Flaw in Hate Law, Editorial, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 31, 2000, at Al 0 ("Sen.
Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, suggested the
bill could allow all rapes to be tried as federal hate crimes."). An incident in Central
Park, where a group of men sexually assaulted women who walked by, was one of the
few times that the concept of a "gender-based" hate crime was discussed in the media.
Melissa Grace, Callfor Laws to Protect Women, DAILY NEWS, June 17, 2000, at 4
("The wolf pack attacks in Central Park were hate crimes against women, and federal
laws need to be toughened to protect against gender-based crimes, Rep. Carolyn Ma-
loney said yesterday.").
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been brought for gender-based hate-crimes.456 The low number of
prosecutions for these crimes suggests that the definitions of these
crimes are murky. The laws as they stand are ineffective both as sym-
bolic measures and as practical tools. The consideration and enactment
of civil remedies specifically aimed at gender-based violence has more
potential to generate discussion and awareness of how violence against
women affects women as a class than does the addition of gender to hate
crime statutes.
Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that the states that most need re-
form will enact remedies for victims of gender-based violence. The
federal VAWA had the benefit of reaching victims of gender-motivated
violence everywhere in the U.S., not just in the more progressive juris-
dictions. Interestingly, before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted,
there were a number of anti-discrimination statutes in states around the
country. The Supreme Court cited to these statutes in its Heart of At-
lanta opinion:5 7 "There is nothing novel about [the federal] legislation.
Thirty-two States now have it on their books either by statute or execu-
tive order and many cities provide such regulation." 58 Although the
enactment of federal civil rights legislation followed widespread accep-
tance of similar laws in the states, the federal remedy was still needed to
reach victims of discrimination in states that refused to enact civil rights
statutes.
The enactment of remedies for gender-motivated violence in more
and more states will put pressure on other states to reform their systems.
Resistance to change may yet require a federal solution. Although the
solution will have to take a different form than the original VAWA pro-
vision, the argument that a federal remedy is necessary will become
stronger as more states enact VAWA-like remedies.
Proponents of state remedies will have to overcome hurdles. The
discourse about VAWA's civil rights provision in newspaper articles,
editorials, commentaries, and in court opinions gives insight into the
challenges that proponents of remedies could face at the state level.
Drafters of local remedies must be mindful that labeling the remedy a
"civil rights law" does not ensure that the press, commentators, or courts
will categorize and interpret the law as civil rights legislation. The press
abandoned the use of the label "civil rights" in its description of the
456. Fewer than 10 cases charging a gender-based hate crime have been brought nation-
wide. Telephone Interview with Staff Member, Anti-Defamation League (Aug.
2000).
457. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 259 n.8 (1964).
458. Id. at 259.
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VAWA remedy, and the Court rejected this classification. Editorials
joined the Court in opposing the remedy, and the press framed the issue
before the Court in a way that de-emphasized the civil rights issues at
stake. Proponents of state and local remedies must, therefore, respond
effectively to claims that the new provisions undermine the rights of
men and defendants and invade the common law. There will be at-
tempts to limit the scope of these remedies, and drafters will have to
decide whether passing bills with strict limitations is worth the com-
promise. For state remedies to be successful, supporters must work to
shape discourse about these remedies in legislatures, in the press, and in
the courts.
CONCLUSION
Drafters of the Violence Against Women Act hoped to change atti-
tudes about violence against women through the civil rights remedy.
Historically, state legal systems have trivialized or ignored violence
against women, especially when this violence is committed in the home
or by someone the woman knows. By attempting to re-categorize vio-
lence against women as a civil rights issue, supporters of the VAWA
remedy wanted to show how gender-motivated violence affects women
as a class. Proponents of the remedy sought to provide a federal forum
for victims of violence to find redress. By placing the matter in federal
court, proponents also hoped to send a message that the violence was of
national concern.
This Article reveals that the press initially called the VAWA provi-
sion a civil rights remedy, but shifted towards describing it as a rape law
or a civil remedy. Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected Congress's
categorization of the remedy as a civil rights law and an appropriate area
for federal regulation. Many commentators and newspaper editors sup-
ported the Morrison decision and argued against describing gender-
motivated violence as discrimination. A number of federal court judges,
newspaper editors, commentators, professors, and politicians, however,
embraced the idea of the violence as a civil rights matter. The debate
over the remedy helped educate the public about the discriminatory na-
ture of some types of violence against women and the problems that
victims of this violence faced in state legal systems.
A number of states and localities are now considering enacting their
own civil rights provisions. Enactment of statutes at the local level can
help bring about the changes in attitude and practice that the drafters of
VAWA wanted. These remedies have the potential to be further reach-
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ing and more effective than the federal VAWA. If the categorization of
violence against women as a civil rights issue is to be successful at the
local level, proponents of the these remedies must understand the last
decade of debate over the federal VAWA and work to shape the public
discourse around these new remedies. t

